Posted June 26, 2025
Suzi Weissman interviewed Yassamine Mather on June 20, 2025 for Jacobin radio. Their discussion has been abridged and edited for posting here.
Suzi Weissman: Welcome to Beneath the Surface. I’m Suzi Weissman and today I’m joined by Yassamine Mather, a longtime socialist critic of the Islamic Republic. She’s the acting editor of Critique, a journal of Socialist Theory, where I am also on that editorial board. Her research on Iran is within the framework of the Middle East Center at the University of Oxford, where she also works as a Scientific Developer in the Advanced Research Computing Department. Yassamine writes regularly on Iran and the Middle East and is the chair of the solidarity group Hands Off the People of Iran.
Yassamine, you’ve written that people in Iranian cities and in Israel have faced indiscriminate bombing and drone attacks. But you’ve noticed that Israelis have sirens and bomb shelters, while there isn’t even a warning siren in Iran. Civilians, including nuclear scientists and military officers, have been assassinated in their homes with collateral damage to residents in the area. Trump has openly threatened the assassination of Iran’s head of state, all while Israel carries out mass starvation in Gaza. What are the reasons for Israel launching a military operation on June 13?
Yassamine Mather: Twenty years ago Netanyahu, when he was in power, but also when he was in opposition, was saying Iran is a few years away from a nuclear weapon. Over the last ten years, every time he’s talked, he’s saying it’s imminent, they’ve got it. The reality is that, as far as I can tell (I’m not I’m not privy to the secrets of the Islamic Republic), Iran was very close to a level where it can promote enrichment to the 90% level, which is weapons-grade uranium. But it stopped a while ago now. The agreement made in 2015 that later Trump walked out of Joao was really limiting Iran to 3.67, if I’m not mistaken, of uranium enrichment. And that is still what is being discussed.
I think Israel really needs to destroy Iran. We are talking about Israel, a country where even Israeli citizens of Arab origin don’t have basic rights. So it’s not about democracy in Iran. And I don’t really think it’s about a bomb either. If Iran did enrich uranium, it still has no means of delivering it — that is. it has missiles but not those that could carry a nuclear bomb.
It really is very difficult to see Netanyahu’s rationale except to divert attention from Gaza. Iran is a country of 90 million, compared to eight or nine million Israelis. Iran is a young country with great capabilities in terms of internet knowledge, computing knowledge, artificial intelligence knowledge. If those capabilities were not drained by sanctions but also by a clerical and corrupt government that diverts the existing talent towards military structures, Israel would have a competitor it couldn’t imagine competing with. That’s why supporting separatist movements based on the nationalities that exist inside Iran’s borders would be good from Israel’s point of view. Dividing Iran into four or five countries would please both the Democrats and Republicans as well.
SW: That was Biden’s plan in Iraq (after the 2003 U.S. invasion), if you remember. And it was rightly condemned as outside imposition by someone who thinks he knows but doesn’t really know the history. Certainly it was planned over the heads of the Iraqi people — and it was a disaster. Are you suggesting that?
YM: Israel has supported parts of the Kurdish separatist movement, not the Kurdish movement but a very small part of it. There is Israeli influence in Iraqi Kurdistan as well. Yet when you’re sitting in Tel Aviv and you look at the opposition groups you’ve spent money on, it is good to exaggerate how powerful they are. And sometimes you believe the propaganda you’ve been spreading. So I think Netanyahu did really believe that the Iranian royalists he’s been paying — and Mossad (Israeli intelligence service) has been grooming — with TV stations and financial support over the last decade, had much support. He must have thought that a few bombs will be enough for them to overthrow the Islamic Republic.
SW: What you are basically to that Israel itself was operating — as Putin did (when Russia invaded Ukraine) – that after a three-day blitz it would be over. Both Netanyahu and Trump have been promoting regime change in Iran, assessing a weakness in the Iranian regime. What do you think?
YM: Okay, there was an impression that things would change in a few days. But this underestimates how a regime like the Islamic Republic operates. It has its devotees who are religious and therefore support the regime. It’s also got people whose financial livelihood depends on this state. And they will support it, at least in the short run. But the royalty’s support on the ground is far weaker than what I thought — the reality is that I haven’t seen a single demonstration of even ten people defending Israel’s action and raising the royalist flag.
The population of Tehran, at least nine million, was told (by Israel and Trump) to leave the capital. Those who could afford to leave had cars and second homes at the Caspian Sea. They did leave and there were traffic jams. But nobody went to a demonstration in the middle of Tehran saying, “Long live Israel for attacking us.” People were leaving their homes, and they were quite upset. Those who were on the internet — before it stopped yesterday — were angry with Israel. And it’s inevitable. You’re destroying their homes. Up to yesterday, 520 had died.
SW: I think today the number is 625 killed.
YM: That sounds right. The figure is old, and people are dying in hospitals as well. Drones destroyed blocks of flats. It doesn’t destroy a single room. Where physicists were killed, their neighbors were as well. The Iranian government is obviously showing pictures of children and women. Who were those people, ordinary people or relatives of Revolutionary Guards or physicists? In any case, it’s unlikely that if you start bombing people then they will support you.
If you remember in 2003, until the U.S. Army actually entered Baghdad, no one was shouting against Saddam Hussein. There’s an element of fear, but there’s also an element of “this is my country.” In Iran, it’s slightly different. There is a sense of nationalism. It is partly culture — poetry, history, the often exaggerated sense of “let’s remember the glorious past.” Of course there is no glorious past in any of these countries. When I went to school, we didn’t read about the Greeks defeating the Persian Empire.
The history of the Persian Empire is reflected in poetry, in nationalist writings by people like Ferdowsi. It goes beyond the Persian nation. Kurds have a historic unity with Persians and speak a dialect of Persian. But Iranian Azeris, Azerbaijanis in Iran speak Turkish — yet although they speak a different language, if you ask them about their history they will go on about the Persian Empire. Very few of them identify with the Ottoman Empire, which came many centuries later.
Nationalities in Iran want far more rights than the Islamic Republic is giving them. But when it comes to another country trying to divide Iran or destroy Iran or Persia, they become nationalist. In the long term, the left will also have problems with this sense of this deep sense of nationalism. However, it’s inevitable that when Israel attacks or when Saddam attacked Iran (in 1981), nationalism is the overwhelming sentiment within the country and trumps everything else.
Legacy of U.S. Intervention
SW: How much is the legacy of U.S. interventions — in the coup in 1953 that got rid of prime minister Mossadegh and installed the Shah, its opposition to the 1979 Iranian revolution, or its role during the Iran-Iraq war — foremost in the minds of most Iranians? Do they see this new attack as perpetuating another legacy of trauma?
YM: That’s definitely true for many of the older generation. The trauma of 1953 remains alive in their minds because this was the only chance the Middle East could have had a democratic government, and it was destroyed by a coup. And then we have 1979.
There is a nostalgia for the Pahlavi era among sections of the young population, even those who are now opposed to the Israeli attack and the royalists. This is partly because of the relentless propaganda that comes from outside TV stations paid by us, paid by Israel, paid by Saudi Arabia. Who presents that era? As you know, they show women wearing short skirts and going to the university.
Actually the Islamic Republic has far higher percentage of women going to university. But it is a religious government that has attacked women’s rights since the day it came to power. So nostalgia exists, but it doesn’t mean that it would reflect itself in people becoming royalists. That is a miscalculation by those who want regime change.
You can have nostalgia for some aspects of that period, but the young generation on Instagram sees how the Pahlavi regime celebrated the 2500 years of Iranian kingdoms in Persepolis with food delivered from Paris for the heads of state who came to celebrate. So although this young generation might have nostalgia for aspects of the era, they are also aware of the negative sides and I don’t think it’s as straightforward as saying, okay, we want the Shah’s son back.
SW: If the Islamic Republic were to fall, and it is weakened, what would be there to pick up the pieces?
YM: My guess is that the Islamic Republic has many supporters who will fight to their very last breath, and it probably has — in the fashion of Hamas, but maybe in a different way — Its own underground tunnels, and not just physical tunnels but ways of infiltrating society. They will fight.
There is no obvious opposition. The royalists, the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (“Peoples Muhahideen,” MEK), supported mainly by some Arab countries, helped Saddam during the Iran-Iraq War. The left has been decimated: killed and forced into exile. So we don’t have a we don’t have an alternative left waiting to take power.
There are the national religious groups. It’s very difficult to know whether they would side with the government or with a revolutionary force. I don’t think they would definitely side with the left, even if the left was strong. Then there is a layer of ordinary people who might not like the Islamic Republic but don’t see an alternative. Do people want to become like Libya? And Libya is an example that everyone is talking about, because the effects of the collapse of a corrupt and failed state will not disappear overnight. You will have infighting. There will be fights between various factions of the Islamic Republic and those factions with the rest of the population. So it’s a prospect of destruction.
Implications of Bombing
[NOTE: This discussion was he;d shortly before the beginning of the U.S. bombing of Iran. —ed.]
SW: If the United States decides to use its bunker buster bombers to take out the nuclear power facilities, what would be the implications?
YM: Okay. An attack on the nuclear facilities would further weaken the regime. This regime has said, “We are going to defend our independence.” If they give up in talks or if there is an effective bombing that destroys some of the installation, that will weaken the regime. But will it collapse? I would say it would continue a process of collapsing, but it won’t collapse immediately. If the plan is to downgrade Iran, to force it into submission, there could be changes within the structures of the Islamic Republic. More hardline Revolutionary Guards might come to power, particularly if the reformists make a deal with the United States.
As for Russia being Iran’s “close ally,” this has been a one-sided relationship. Russia made a threat, but it as well as Israel does not want a very strong Iran. What would China do? China’s been benefiting from the sanctions on Iran because Iran can’t sell oil to anybody but China. Losing Iranian oil would have some effect but wouldn’t be disastrous for China.
There are benefits for Russia to at least appear to oppose further attacks on Iran, and it’s offering its services as a mediator. Sections of the Iranian government have serious illusions about how Russia will help them. I can’t see either of these two countries endangering their own interests to aid Iran. They haven’t done anything for Gaza. Given the sentiments in global South, I would have thought it would be at least beneficial to do something more than occasionally passing resolutions in the UN that then are vetoed.
SW: Although unlikely, there is the possibility is a full-scale war, and especially a war between nuclear powers. But Israel, Iran, the United States and Russia are all led by hardliners who are very, very invested in protecting and extending their own power. They don’t care about the death and destruction they leave in their wake. Do you see a diplomatic off ramp?
YM: Yes, there is a threat of war. And you’re right that all these countries are led by unbelievably unpredictable and dangerous people. The negotiations have some room. So my limited understanding of these secret talks is that there is bargaining about percentages. Now Iran is in a difficult position. It’s putting a brave face. My guess is that the Iranian Air Force is at almost at the limit of what it can do. Yes, it can occasionally break through Israel’s Iron Dome and inflict damage. But we are talking about medium-range missiles that cost between one or two million each. How many did they have? How many have they lost? Iran needs to find a face-saving solution where enrichment is allowed.
While Trump is saying “I don’t want war,” my understanding is he’s coming under pressure from MAGA who do not want war. With these factors, there can be a negotiation where everyone finds a face-saving alternative. But the percentage of achieving this isn’t impossible, but not very high.
SW: One of the Israel’s first airstrikes hit Tabriz, an industrial city with a history of labor unrest and struggle. Do you see these Israeli strikes aimed at political infrastructure as well the military infrastructure?
YM: The strikes on a tractor factory and a cellular plant were attacks on infrastructure. But the effect is going to be political in that these workers have a very long tradition of opposition to the Shah’s regime as well as this regime. Their history goes back to the 1950s. This attack on the working class is not going to help the struggles of the working class.
There have also been attacks on oil installations depots with refineries set on fire. All of that reduces a working class already facing attacks by neoliberal economics in Iran’s Islamic Republic. It’s a very vulnerable working class that was facing job insecurity and low wages. More than a third of population has been living on the poverty line; it will now face even more pressures.
This situation doesn’t result in more strikes, more struggles, more workers protesting but on the on the contrary, it creates a situation where everyone is trying to survive. In that survival, political struggle is a luxury they can’t afford. So yes, I think it is an attack on the Iranian working class.
I have read leaflets written by soft left groups, saying that this is a war between Iran’s Islamic Republic and Zionism and has nothing to do with the Iranian people. That’s true of many wars. But To consider the Islamic Republic imperialist is just madness.
The reality is that the victims of this war are not the leaders of the Islamic Republic. It’s the ordinary people who’ve lost their homes and their jobs. This week, the government closed all offices and factories to allow people to leave major cities without facing penalties. But this can’t be sustained for long. My guess is that some of these jobs will disappear. It’s a bit like Covid or any other disaster. At the end of the day, it’s the working class who will pay for it.
SW: But what about the regime itself? Roger Cohen in Friday’s New York Times calls Iran a zombie regime, deeply unpopular, slowly collapsing, but still dangerous. The Wall Street Journal on June 20th details how this conflict is rattling the foundations of Iran’s theocratic rule, and posits whether or not this could lead to collapse or civil war, or just more repression. Does talk of regime change serve both Netanyahu and the Iranian right? Does Israel’s action, rather than further weakening the regime, fortify it?
YM: Without knowing the extent of the damage that the state has faced, an assessment is difficult. I would say that the regime is shaken. It’s weakened, but not at the level of collapse. Today there were demonstrations after Friday prayers in Tehran where people were demonstrating against Israel and against the war. But such demonstrations are always used by the Islamic states to present them as support for the regime. Where you draw the line?
I would say the majority are angry about the war. Their demands are mainly against Israel. But once that issue is resolved and the regime survives — and that’s a big if — they will show their anger at the Islamic Republic as well. They will see that the state endangered their livelihood, it endangered their very existence. But for now the government is benefiting because people are saying, “we hate this regime, but we don’t want foreigners attacking our country.”
SW: How do you see the international left’s response to these attacks? As with Russia’s war in Ukraine, we see those on the anti-imperialist left, who always see NATO and the United States behind everything that happens in the world. They are embracing Iran simply because it opposes the United States and Israel. They are ignoring the deeply reactionary Iranian regime’s brutality toward its own people, its repression of women and workers. What has the left said so far? How can the left express solidarity with the Iranian people?
YM: The main task in Britain or in the United States is to oppose one’s own imperialist government without defending anything else. The main target is defeatism for the United States and UK. That in itself is supporting the Iranian people without falling into the traps that “the enemy of my enemy must be my friend.” However, since October 2023 the Islamic Republic has gained allies not just amongst the left in Western countries, but also amongst the left in neighboring countries, in Greece, in Turkey.
Partly it is the absence of any alternative. The weakness of the left allowed this to happen. There is no doubt that the situation is even worse than during the Iran-Iraq war or the 1980-81 hostage crisis. Then people were saying, “Iran is great because it’s opposing imperialism.” Just to explain, the Islamic Republic and its leader don’t use the word imperialism. All they say is “arrogant powers.”
SW: I heard one interview, on mainstream media here with an Iranian exile who’s quite right wing, say that his hopes are that in the end there would be a democratic, secular state. Of course we could say the same thing about Israel. Is this pie in the sky for Iran?
YM: I think at this stage, yes, because what forces could organize such a state? We are at a stage where the crisis is so harsh in many of the countries of the region, but in Iran in particular. Reform solutions, middle-of-the-road solutions, soft solutions don’t work. Either the working class can win — and at the moment this is a limited possibility — and create a true democracy, or there will be another class dictatorship. There may be an elite parliament, but not a democracy.
SW: I want to thank you so much, Yassamine Mather, for joining us today and helping us understand what’s going on.
YM: Thank you very much for inviting me, and for asking very good questions.
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