Posted April 3, 2011
The Libyan revolution began as did most revolutions in the Arab world, with protests against a cruel dictator. The protests grew large by mid-February and were especially large in Tripoli.[i] What quickly distinguished Libya from the rest of the Arab world was the brutality of the dictator’s counter attack and the response of the protesters.
By early March the democratic protest movement had transformed into a civil war. Exactly how and why this happened is still not entirely clear. Muammar
Qaddafi’s repression was deadlier than that of Syria’s Assad, or Yemen’s Saleh.[ii] Protesters in several cities responded
to Qaddafi’s repression by finding arms and fighting back. In Benghazi armed
protesters battled Qaddafi agents, eventually driving them from the city.[iii] Several cities and towns in both eastern and western Libya were soon liberated.
The
decision to launch a territorial battle with the regime does not appear to be
made by anyone. Key defections in the Libyan military made it possible for the
rebels to hold most of the cities in the east. By early March Qaddafi had
suppressed most of the protests that had emanated from the plebeian districts
of Tripoli and recaptured most, although not all, of the territories in the
west. The revolutionary protests turned into a revolutionary war but there is
little evidence anyone planned it that way.
Regionalism? Tribalism?
This
turn of events has left many commentators, including many on the left, to
conclude the conflict in Libya is not a revolution but a tribal or regional
civil war. Such analyses, however, are based less in fact than in prejudices
about the Arab world.
Leftists
should be particularly hesitant to embrace arguments that the current conflict is
a reflection of Libya’s tribal divisions. The view that Arabs are more tribal
than national is, after all, a key component of Orientalist mythology. Libyan writer Alaa al-Ameri argues that Libyans’ sense of nationality has been stronger than tribal or regional
loyalty for most of the 20th and 21st centuries. She
explains how Qaddafi used his patronage system as a method of fomenting tribal
divisions. Now, however, Libyans are rising up, not against rival tribes but
against the regime. Western leftists should take her plea seriously. “By
labeling us as ‘tribal’ you effectively dismiss the notion that our uprising
has anything to do with freedom, democracy or human dignity. Do you place
narrow regional loyalties above these values? I’m sure you would reject any
such characterisation, and naturally so. Please do
us, as Libyans, the courtesy of allowing us the same human characteristics you
attribute to yourselves.”[iv]
The argument that
the Libyan revolution is essentially a regional struggle is equally problematic.
When the uprising began it spread to numerous cities in the west, the most
famous of which is Misurata. As of April 2, 2011,
however, government forces have still failed to recapture Misurata or Zintan (south west of Tripoli). Nor do any of the
rebels’ political demands have a regional quality. The Transitional National
Council calls for a united, democratic Libya with Tripoli as its capital.[v]
Who are the rebels?
This
question has been hotly debated both within the mainstream press and also on
the left. The fact that it is difficult to answer that question with any
precision is evidence of the revolutionary character of the current conflict.
As of now, no one individual or group is in control. Within Benghazi there is
the Transitional National Council. It consists mostly of elite forces, some of
whom were recent defectors from the Qaddafi camp. Their control appears to be
limited. They do not seem to direct the military campaigns, nor do they even
control Benghazi. The new Benghazi city council operates independently. And it
is unlikely that the TNC has any influence over revolutionaries in Misurata or Zintan.[vi]
Limited
in number, the rebel fighters have mainly been untrained volunteers. According
to Jon Lee Anderson “[t]he hard core of the
fighters has been the shabab—the young
people whose protests in mid-February sparked the uprising.” There are many
religious fighters among the volunteers as well but there is little evidence
that their goal is a theocracy. There is no method of compelling any of these
forces to fight. They do so because they believe in their cause and like most
protesters throughout the Arab world they consider life under the dictator no
longer tolerable.[vii]
The
volunteer nature of the rebellion makes the fighting more chaotic and, on the
rebel side, deadlier. These shahab show little evidence of knowing how to fight, or use
weapons. Soldiers appear to race to the front lines in their personal vehicles
with minimal coordination or secure escape routes. Press reports depict scenes
of rebels firing missiles in the wrong direction and of failing to secure
mortar cannons to the ground before firing them, making proper aim impossible.
The TNC reported that some rebel soldiers fired wildly into the air on April 1,
2011 thus provoking a NATO strike which killed several rebels.[viii]
The
chaotic nature of the rebellion also provides grounds for hope. The Libyan
revolt has swept into motion masses of protesters and volunteer fighters who
are not under anyone’s control. Even the early protests in Tripoli appeared
somewhat spontaneous, with few identifiable banners or clearly planned march
routes. If they succeed they will have confidence in their own abilities to
organize and struggle, opening space for more progressive political
developments. If they are defeated such hopes will be snuffed out. While the
NATO powers will undoubtedly attempt to influence the politics of the rebels,
there is little evidence they have succeeded thus far.[ix]
The
diffuse character of the Libyan revolution so far should not surprise us. The
constellation of contradictory forces is typical of most revolutionary
processes. The Egyptian revolution of January25 to February 11 brought together
varying social forces whose only unifying demand was embodied in the
revolution’s principal slogan: “the people demand the end of the regime.” The
protests initially united capitalists frustrated by rampant government
corruption and youths and professionals who wanted an end to the police state. Hossam el-Hamalawy’s description
of people getting out of their Mercedes Benz cars to distribute water to
protesters is telling.[x] During
those heady days at Tahrir Square western media
attention focused on the roles of Mohammed el-Baradei and the Muslim Brotherhood. Yet neither of them proved capable of controlling
events. Only in the last three days did a strike wave break out which
ultimately forced Mubarak to step down. The aftermath of February 11 has
brought a military regime led by former Mubarak generals. They have set up an
electoral system which favors traditional, more conservative parties. On the
streets violence against women continues, as does anti-Coptic violence.[xi] And the military’s first priority appears to be to break strikes and institute
a counter-revolution. What is important, however, is that the protests and
strikes are continuing. Independent unions and left organizations have formed. By
defeating the dictator Egypt’s revolutionaries have opened the door to new
possibilities. Exactly where it will lead is impossible to predict.
The Rebels and
human rights
On
March 31, 2011 Wolfgang Weber published an article entitled,“Libyan
rebels massacre black Africans.” The article appeared on numerous websites
simultaneously. As the title suggests, Weber alleges that rebel forces have
engaged in repeated massacres of black Africans. He provides no footnotes or
other citations. He alleges that his primary source of information is an
article by the German sociologist Gunnar Heinsohn from the March 22, 2011 issue of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. A
search of that newspaper’s website yielded no such article, although several
other Heinsohn articles on unrelated topics did
appear. Nor did repeated google searches produce evidence of such a Heinsohn article. And I have found no other references to it,
which is strange because Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung is a
world-reknowned newspaper.[xii]
When
dealing with difficult subjects like this we need to be careful. We should be
open-minded enough to accept facts which may challenge our assumptions. At the
same time, it is irresponsible to engage in rumor mongering. From the scattered
bits of reliable evidence we can piece together a story that is not pretty. But
nor does it confirm the wild allegations promoted on numerous pro-Qaddafi, or
anti-rebellion websites.
Like
many petro-dictators, Qaddafi has relied on immigrant workers who come to Libya
for employment opportunities. They come from eastern and southern Asia, the middle east, and northern Africa. The AFL-CIO’s Solidarity
Center estimates that sub-Saharan workers constitute as much as one-third of
Libya’s active workforce.[xiii] Estimates
vary, however. Precise demographic data is difficult to come by in a police
state. Under Qaddafi’s rule immigrant workers had no legal rights and were
barred from joining even the legally-constrained trade unions.
As
is often the case in countries with large numbers of migrant workers, there
have been periodic waves of anti-immigrant violence. Human Rights Watch has
tracked cases of mob violence against sub-Saharan Africans in Libya since 2006.[xiv]
The
outbreak of civil war in late February had particularly devastating effects on
immigrant workers. Entire cities have been vacated. Production in many areas
has shut down. HRW reports that thousands of migrants have been attempting to
flee Libya since the beginning of the conflict. Those whose home countries have
been willing to send rescue ships have been the lucky ones. Many others have
been trapped in refugee camps, living in terrible conditions.
Within
the camps several sub-Saharan workers have reported being victimized by mob
violence. So far the reports do not make clear who the mobs were, or whether
they have any connection to the rebel organizations. Nor, from the limited
number of reports, can we estimate how many have been killed. [xv]
There
is some evidence that some rebel fighters and authorities are guilty of racial
profiling and racial violence. Included among the testimony provided to Human
Rights Watch are accounts of beatings at the hands of rebel fighters. In reaction
to Qaddafi’s widely-reported use of mercenaries from Chad and Niger[xvi],
some Black Africans in Benghazi have been arrested on spurious evidence of
collaboration with the regime. Again, it is difficult to tell how widespread
this is. Most reports refer to a single event in Benghazi involving fewer than
ten people. But it would not be surprising if it occurred more frequently,
given the chaos of civil war, the primitive character of revolutionary justice
in general, and the racial bigotry which is undoubtedly still common-place.
A
March 29, 2011 Toronto Globe and Mail article provides some details of the above-mentioned events. It also indicates
that the human rights situation has improved since mid-March. The TNC has
appointed human rights activist Mohamed el-Allagi as
its new Minister of Justice and has welcomed the involvement of HRW and the Red
Cross to improve its human rights record. Whether this is more PR than reality,
and whether el-Allagi will actually have power over
anything is yet to be seen.[xvii]
We
should be critically open-minded about these events. It may be that some rebel
forces have engaged in reprehensible attacks. And we should have no illusions
that a successful revolution will end such attacks, any more than the Egyptian
revolution has ended religious or gender violence. What we can say with
confidence is that if the Qaddafi regime prevails it will reinstitute all of
the racist policies that have made immigrant workers second-class citizens, and
created the conditions for racial and ethnic conflicts. If the revolution
succeeds, there is at least the possibility of new political forces emerging
which can envision a different kind of social order.
Imperialism and the rebels
By
mid-March the Qaddafi regime had recaptured the offensive. Outnumbered and
poorly equipped the rebel armies were abandoning territory in central Libya and
government forces were closing in on Benghazi. A massive counter-revolutionary
assault, implying possible defeat for the rebel forces and a potential
humanitarian catastrophe was imminent.[xviii]
At this
point rebels in Benghazi loudly demanded a “no fly zone” to protect them from
Qaddafi’s air assault. On March 17, 2011 the United Nations Security Council
established a robust no fly zone under Resolution 1973. Someday the documents
of all the frantic discussions that must have occurred within all the capitals
of the great powers will shed light on the complex set of motives that led the
great powers to intervene. From outside the halls of power several motivations
seem probable: fear of a large flood of north African refugees into southern
Europe, a desire to influence rather than further alienate the Arab
revolutions, fear that civil war would disrupt oil flows out of Libya. Gilbert Achcar suggests the United States and the Europeans also
feared that a massacre in Benghazi would pressure them to impose sanctions on
Qaddafi, cutting off their supply of Libyan oil. One commonplace assumption
does not make sense, however. The imperial powers are not in this in order to
seize Libyan oil. Western corporations have had lucrative oil contracts for
years and there was no evidence of corporate pressure to oust Qaddafi before
the revolution began.[xix]
This
situation produced a gut-wrenching debate on the left. Leftists have correctly
been suspicious of the motives of the great powers, and skeptical that they
have any interest in promoting a democratic revolution in Libya. However, in
the third week of March the only options left were a victory of Qaddafi’s
counter-revolution or the prevention of that victory by western air strikes.[xx]
Trying
to find a way out of the conundrum of supporting the revolution while opposing
imperialist intervention some leftists proposed alternatives, none of which
were plausible. Achcar explains that providing
weapons to the rebels, while desirable, would not have avoided the problem. The
time frame was very short. And anti-aircraft and anti-tank weaponry require
training. In fact, to be effective, western arms would have to have come with
trainers and advisors. And they would have been targeted to those rebels the
great powers most preferred. In short, it would have been no less an
imperialist intervention.
British
socialist Kevin Ovenden proposed that instead of
western military intervention, leftists should have demanded Egyptian
intervention. In his response to Achcar Ovenden argues that the Egyptian military, pressured by
radical mass sentiment in Cairo, could have played a revolutionary role in
Libya. “You only have to picture Egyptian flags,” Ovenden writes, “of the kind that fluttered in Tahrir Square, being waved in Benghazi rather than the
Tricolor and Union Jack to appreciate what the difference would be.” It is
a beautiful image. It was also a fantasy. The Egyptian military, preoccupied
with checking the growth of the newly independent and militant labor movement,
was unlikely to attempt to internationalize the very revolution it is
determined to stop. Left forces in Egypt who raised those demands were more
than justified. And they may have contributed to political education within
Egypt. But it was never a practical solution to the crisis in Benghazi.
In
this context, however, it is worth noting one alternative that may not have
been able to relieve the pressure on Benghazi but would have been politically
useful. Had Cuba’s Fidel Castro or Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez expressed direct
support for the Libyan revolution they could have impacted the political
balance of forces within the rebel camp and within the middle
east. Cuba and Venezuela, instead of France, could have been the first
countries to recognize the TNC. Instead of Qatar, they could have been the
first to open trade deals. They probably could have offered arms and trainers,
even if they couldn’t provide a no fly zone.
Instead
they offered equivocal statements. They opposed western intervention, supported
vague conceptions of Libyan self-determination, and never once supported the
Libyan revolution. Castro recounted Qaddafi’s allegedly progressive history and
how he had been repeatedly victimized by imperialism. Chavez doubted the
reports of Qaddafi’s brutality.[xxi] In short the two most prominent
figures who claim to be revolutionaries and socialists made it clear to the
Libyan revolutionaries, and to revolutionaries throughout the Arab world, that
they were not on their side. [xxii]
By
refusing to support the Libyan revolution Castro and Chavez have done yet
further damage to the image of socialism in the Arab world. This is especially
destructive because Qaddafi’s repeated use of socialist rhetoric has already
associated socialism with tyranny and corruption. Their verbal intervention has made the work of socialists
that much harder.
Libya and the Arab spring
So
far the demands of the protesters in every Arab country are limited. They want
an end to the dictatorship and political freedom. In Bahrain, the protests
began demanding a constitutional rather than an absolute monarchy. In Syria,
most activists originally called only for legal reforms, but more and more have
now demanded an end to Assad’s rule. Only in Egypt has a mass workers movement
erupted. But there is not yet a significant section of that movement raising
socialist demands.
What
makes these revolutions exciting is that masses of people are in the streets.
They are creating in practice the democratic reforms they demand. To the extent
they can force open their societies, break the power of the dictators, they
create new possibilities. In that context masses of people learn how powerful
they really are.
The
Libyan revolution began in much the same way. Unfortunately, it has taken on a
military character, which makes mass protests difficult. But the massive
plebeian character of even the rebel military is apparent from all reports. If
Qaddafi is victorious it will put an end to the revolutionary potential of this
moment in Libya. That will have a devastating effect on the masses of Libya and
a demoralizing effect on protesters throughout the Arab world. If Qaddafi can
be overthrown, however, then there is potential for a revival of mass movements.
[i] For a video of one of the Tripoli protests of February 28, 2011 see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0YgygsXWOYM
[ii] Human Rights Watch has documented the number of oppositionists disappeared
under Qaddafi. See
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/03/30/libya-least-370-missing-countrys-east
[iii] Robert F.
Worth, “On Libya’s Revolutionary Road” New York
Times Magazine, April 3, 2011
[iv] Alaa al-Ameri. “The myth of
tribal Libya.” Guardian.
March 30, 2011. Zionist leaders have similarly emphasized and attempted to
exacerbate tribal, clannish, and confessional loyalties among Palestinians in
order to blunt Palestinian nationalism. See Hillel Cohen, Good Arabs. (2010)
[v] On the question of regionalism see the debate between Juan Cole and Vijay Prashaud. http://www.democracynow.org/2011/3/29/a_debate_on_us_military_intervention
The New York
Times runs an interactive map of the Libyan rebellion which shows how
widespread it originally was in western Libya. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/02/25/world/middleeast/map-of-how-the-protests-unfolded-in-libya.html For the demands of the Transitional National Council see the recent essay by
Gilbert Achcar: http://www.zcommunications.org/barack-obama-s-libya-speech-and-the-tasks-of-anti-imperialists-by-gilbert-achcar
[vi] For a
description of relations between the TNC and other authorities see Worth, op
cit.
[vii] Jon Lee
Anderson, “Who are the rebels?” New Yorker, April 4, 2011. For a more
analytical description of the rebel forces see Nicolas Pelham’s “Libya in the
Balance.” MERIP, March 15, 2011. http://www.merip.org/mero/mero031511.
[viii] http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2011/04/20114354942249240.html.
There is evidence that discipline may have improved over the past week: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110401/ap_on_bi_ge/af_libya
[ix] Marwan Bishara, “Libyan Karzai? Chalabi? Forget It.” http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/2011/03/2011328194855872276.html
The recent
TNC ceasefire offer is also interesting in this regard. It requires that
Qaddafi withdraw his military from the central cities and allow peaceful
protests. It does not suggest a power sharing agreement. Qaddafi, not
surprisingly, refused. See Phyllis Bennis’ opinion
essay: http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/04/201142131720113248.html#
[x] “The
Egyptian Elite and the Egyptian Revolt: Video Interview with Hossam el-Hamalawy.” http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/1022/the-egyptian-elite-and-the-egyptian-revolt_video-i
[xi] On anti-Coptic violence see http://www.copts.com/english/?p=1096. Nesrine Malik’s analysis of the complexities of women’s roles in
the Arab revolutions is worth reading: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/apr/02/arab-women-protesters
[xii]For the
Weber article see: http://www.wsws.org/articles/2011/mar2011/rebe-m31.shtml.
If anyone can find a link to the Heinsohn piece
please post it in the comments section.
[xiii] http://www.solidaritycenter-dz.org/b5.php
[xiv] http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/03/02/libya-stranded-foreign-workers-need-urgent-evacuation
[xv] The International Business Times of March 1,
2011 had some fragmentary information. http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/117665/20110301/libya-africans.htm.
Al-jazeera also produced a video report on some of
the victims of racial violence: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YNA8z5G-Xmk
[xvi] Worth
interviewed some of these mercenaries. Op cit.
[xvii] . http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/africa-mideast/in-a-rebel-prison-any-african-is-a-mercenary/article1960597/
[xviii]On March
17, 2011 HRW warned of an imminent threat to civilians. http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/03/17/libya-benghazi-civilians-face-grave-risk
[xix] http://www.israeli-occupation.org/2011-03-24/gilbert-achcar-libya-a-legitimate-and-necessary-debate-from-an-anti-imperialist-perspective/
[xx] Ibid.
[xxi] For an example of one of Castro’s statements see http://www.finalcall.com/artman/publish/Perspectives_1/article_7662.shtml
For a video
of Chavez’s infamous “No me consta …” speech see http://www.marthacolmenares.com/2011/03/01/video-no-me-consta-que-gadafi-sea-un-asesino-ha-dicho-hugo-chavez/ On the same site is an earlier speech in which Chavez
compared Qaddafi to Simon Bolivar.
[xxii] While
their statements do not explicitly endorse the counter-revolution, they have
created the impression throughout the middle east that
they do. Castro and Chavez have now had six weeks to correct that impression
and failed to do so.