women's culture.

168. There seems to be some concern that expanding opportunities for women in the mainstream are undermining the production, distribution and performance of women's music. Jennifer Einhorn, "Women's Music, Where Did it Go?", in *Sojourner*, September 1991, 34–35.
169. Two New York area-based publications, *New Directions for Women* and *On the Issues*, have circulations almost twice as large, and the new *Ms.* probably about four times as large. They are difficult to characterize, because their content is fairly eclectic. However, they are certainly self-consciously *political* and feminist and clearly to the left of the other women's magazines.
170. Hester Eisenstein, *Contemporary Feminist Thought* (Boston, 1983); Alice Echols, *Daring To Be Bad* (Minneapolis, 1990).
171. See, for instance, the interview with lesbian separatist Sonia Johnson, "Sonia Johnson: Breaking Free," in *Sojourner*, January 1988, 16; and the critical response by Angela Bowen, Terri Ortiz, Jennifer Abod, and Jacqui Alexander, "Taking Issue With Sonia," *Sojourner*, February 1988, 14.
172. Janet Biehl, *Rethinking Ecofeminist Politics* (Boston, 1991).
173. Barbara Epstein, *Political Protest and Cultural Revolution: Nonviolent Direct Action in the 1970s and 1980s* (Berkeley, 1991).
174. For a more extensive discussion of this point, see Chapter 8 above.
175. Lisa Duggan, "Making it Perfectly Queer," *Socialist Review* 22, no. 1 (January–March 1992).

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Conclusion

Intersections, Locations, and Capitalist Class Relations: Intersectionality from a Marxist Perspective

In feminist theory "intersectionality" has emerged as an analytic strategy to address the interrelation of multiple, crosscutting institutionalized power relations defined by race, class, gender, and sexuality (and other axes of domination). Most intersectional analysis focuses at the level of social location, a "place" defined by these intersecting axes of domination, and asks how a social location shapes experience and identity. In the first part of this essay I follow such an approach. If feminism is to become a powerful movement again, working-class women will have to organize across the divides of race/ethnicity and sexuality. Therefore, it is of political importance to understand how class locations, in intersection with race/ethnicity and sexuality, shape women's survival projects, their strategies for claiming self-worth and exercising public authority, their uses of motherhood as an identity, and their responses to cultural constructions of their sexuality. I explore class differences within racial/ethnic groups as well as class similarities across racial/ethnic divides as a route toward delineating the potential common ground for a working-class women's politics and for a feminist politics of class.

In the second part of the essay I move from class as social location to class as social relations of production. Here I show how the possibilities for resistance in different class locations develop within a political context which is in turn shaped by capitalist relations of production, by the dynamics of the capitalist economy and the powers of the capitalist class. Coming back to themes of earlier essays in this volume, I argue that global capitalist restructuring has reconfigured the political terrain in the U.S. with profound strategic implications for feminism and other movements of liberation.

Class Locations and Intersections

Intersectional analysis, developed primarily by feminist women-of-color scholars and writers, demonstrates that race and gender oppressions do not build on each other in any simple additive way. White feminists' failure to understand this has contributed significantly to missed opportunities for building an inclusive feminist movement. An exemplary instance of this failure occurred in the positions taken by mainstream feminists in the politics around Anita Hill's testimony at the Senate confirmation hearings for Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas. By claiming Anita Hill's experience as representative of all professional women's experience of sexual harassment, white feminists fundamentally eliminated her specificity as a Black professional woman.[1] They thereby missed an opportunity to publicly acknowledge the existence and impact of racial oppression. Anita Hill did not experience or respond to her harassment as a gender assault separate from experiences of the racial discrimination she might have faced in her efforts to succeed as a professional. Positioned by her race, Anita Hill had to deal with her harassment under constraints that white professional women do not face. She had to be a credit to her race. If her success came at a personal cost of enduring harassment, she had to weigh that cost against a more collective one: disappointing all those who counted on her success and who had supported her along the way. White feminists interpreted her long silence about the harassment as the consequence of the isolation and self-blame that many middle-class white women experience in similar situations. In so doing, they not only ignored the history of Black women's understanding and awareness of their sexual vulnerability in the public world; they also minimized the particular dangers confronting Black women who publicly resist sexual exploitation. Black women's representations in the dominant culture as sexually voracious and promiscuous threatened not only to discredit Anita Hill individually but to vitiate one very crucial purpose of her professional striving—to recuperate Black women's image by refuting what everyone believes about *the* Black woman. Finally, her silence came out of a long history of racial solidarity. Thus, Anita Hill's silence as well as her speaking out, the uses to which her speech was put by white feminists and the ways in which her speech was discounted by (mostly but not entirely) male spokespeople for the Black community, were emblematic of the difficulties as well as potentials of Black women's location at the intersection of race and gender.

Women-of-color feminists have also drawn on gender/race intersectionality to critique sexism in their communities and male dominance in organizations and movements against racial oppression both historically and today.[2] As in the case of Anita Hill, male leaderships decide what is and is not called for in the name of racial solidarity. Kimberlé Crenshaw offers this telling example: "while gang violence, homicide, and other forms of Black-on-Black crime have increasingly been discussed within African-American politics, patriarchal ideas about gender and power preclude the recognition of domestic violence as yet another compelling incidence of Black-on-Black crime."[3]

Perhaps the most well-explored instance of race/gender intersectionality has been the different locations of white women and women of color in the work of social reproduction. Historically and today, whether in the private household (domestic servant and her employer) or in the public sphere (hotel maids/nurses' aides/kitchen workers and professionals/supervisors/administrative support staff), women of color do the most menial, difficult, and dirty work. As Glenn puts it, "this racial construction of gendered labor has created divisions between White and racial ethnic women that go beyond difference in experience and standpoint. Their situations have been interdependent: the higher status and living standards of White women have depended on the subordination and lower standards of living of women of color."[4] Although Glenn terms this an analysis of race/gender intersectionality, class and capitalism lurk in the background. All white women are not upper middle class—indeed the majority are working class and don't employ either nannies for their children or domestic workers to clean their houses. And the majority of poor women are white women, even though white women are far less likely to be poor than women of color. At the same time, class differences appear to have increased among women of color. In the post-civil-rights era, opportunities for some women of color to enter the middle class of managerial and professional workers have expanded even as working-class women of color have lost ground, with the most vulnerable pushed even further into poverty. Glenn's contribution to feminist theory is substantial and groundbreaking. Here I want to build on her insights to indicate the importance of integrating class into analysis of race/gender intersections. Class analysis is crucial to understanding how and why different groups of women adopt different survival projects which shape and are shaped by possibilities for collective action.

Women, class, and resistance

Class locations are difficult to define, especially when we attempt to capture how positions in the economy create bundles of individual experiences and group affiliations which might give rise to distinctly different identities, or interests, or worldviews. There is a very large literature debating how to draw these lines or to deal with those many class locations that seem to be contradictory in terms of their attributes. Defining class locations becomes especially fraught for intersectional analysis, because in most instances we are not comparing those who own capital with those who do not, but are trying rather to understand relations of power and relative privilege among those who do wage and salaried work.[5] For the purposes of this essay, I use "middle class" to mean roughly salaried professionals and managers, divided between those at the upper reaches who are closer to capital and those at the lower end who are closer to working-class occupations. I use "working class" to mean blue-, white-, and pink-collar waged workers and those who never access permanent employment. I am interested here in two aspects of class/race intersectionality in shaping women's resistance strategies: class differences within racial/ethnic groups and class similarities across the racial/ethnic divide. First, drawing from a rich historical literature on Black women's political organization and resistance, I lay out some of the ways that class differences among Black women created lines of conflict as well as alliance. Second, I explore how class location shapes similar dilemmas of gender identity for working-class women across their racial/ethnic differences.

From reconstruction through the civil-rights era Black women, whether working class (domestic and service workers, married to blue-collar men or sharecroppers) or middle class (schoolteachers, nurses, social workers, or married to them) or members of the Black elite (affluent professionals and business people), shared in the development of community institutions, and a "collective wisdom" passed down from one generation to the next. Based in the educational, occupational, and housing segregation that organized racial oppression in the U.S., a Black civil society emerged that gave Black women a field for collective action and the development of distinct identities as "race women." Most educated and professional Black middle-class women were relegated to the segregated institutions of their communities—Black schools and colleges, Black social service agencies, and so on. Rather than separating themselves from their working-class sisters, they created and sustained a tradition of reform work for racial uplift.[6] Within this very strong and

honorable reform tradition, however, there were class tensions and conflicts. More than one "culture of resistance" could be found in Black civil society. These different cultures of resistance arose from different class locations.

Deborah Gray White documents how the class location of middle-class (and "elite") Black women reformers shaped their worldviews, organizational practices, and political strategies.[7] They arrived at their political choices not only as an expression of their class-based worldview, but in response to the avenues open to them for exercising political influence. The emergence of the Black women's club movement coincided with the formation of a new urban Black middle class and the opening up of new terrains for Black political organization, terrains which came to be dominated by middle-class men and women.[8]

Elsa Barkeley Brown argues that the development of gender identities was integral to this process: "[t]hrough discussions of manhood and womanhood, middle-class men and women constructed themselves as respectable and entitled, and sought to use such constructions to throw a mantle of protection over their working-class brothers and sisters."[9] The duty of the middle-class club woman was to provide not just social services for the poor but services that in one way or another educated the Black working-class, and particularly Black women, on the means and benefits of achieving respectability.

Just as many early twentieth-century white women reformers carved out a political space for themselves in social housekeeping, so also Black middle-class women found a public role in the moral uplift of African-American working-class and poor women.[10] Black working-class women, like their immigrant working-class counterparts, often resisted and resented being defined as in need of improvement. Despite these parallels, however, it is necessary to be very clear that the class tensions and conflicts between Black elite/middle-class and Black working-class/poor women were significantly different from the intersecting class and race divisions that brought middle-class white women reformers into relation to working-class and poor women from other racial/ethnic communities. The "Americanization" projects that motivated Anglo white middle-class women reformers had different roots and the effects of their strategies different (and more negative) consequences, politically and economically, for working-class and poor women.[11] Shared racial oppression and more closely shared economic circumstances than those that characterized white middle-class reformers and their clients led Black middle-class women to organize programs and advance

political views that better reflected the needs of the women they were trying to serve.[12]

Furthermore, Black middle-class women's anxieties about proving respectability and virtue were themselves a response to white supremacist representations of super-sexualized Black womanhood. These cultural figurations of Black women were so threatening because they legitimated the social, economic, and political power structures through which Black women's labor was exploited, their motherhood denied, their bodies abused and invaded. These representations were also, and especially, galling to Black middle-class women, as they were often used to justify Black women's exclusion from white middle-class society and from social positions of honor and leadership, positions for which they were eminently qualified by virtue of their educational attainment and social comportment. However, Black clubwomen's strategic choice—to build a counter-identity on chastity, virtue, community service, and cultural refinement—also reflected gender and class relations *within* the Black community.[13] Deborah Gray White points out that in making chastity the foremost requirement for middle-class status, "club women established an orthodoxy bound to drive a wedge between themselves and the masses of black women."[14] For Black working-class women were in the process of developing and defining their own strategies for claiming self-worth. In the next section I discuss how different groups of women within the Black working class negotiated the dilemmas surrounding their sexuality and gender identity.

Black working-class women had as much, if not more, than Black middle-class women to fear from white supremacist constructions of their sexuality. Black women workers were threatened and bedeviled by their white male employers; sexual harassment, attempted and completed rape, were endemic occupational hazards of factory work and domestic service. Thus, it was not only middle-class Black women who adopted a "culture of dissemblance." Black working-class women also felt compelled to hide any expression of their sexuality from public view.[15] On the other hand, as interviews with Black women workers in domestic service show, many Black working-class women made clear distinctions between how they had to present themselves to the white world and who they really were.[16] Within their own urban communities, working-class Black women, especially young women, resonated to a feminine identity quite different from that which the middle-class wished to impose: the explicit sexual self-assertion of the women blues singers of the 1920s. Performing in working-class clubs and finding a mass audience for their recordings among urban workers, men and women, the blues singers challenged dominant ideals of respectable womanhood and defied the silencing of Black women's sexuality. They sang openly about the pleasures as well as the dangers of Black women's heterosexual relationships; they engaged in and made recordings about lesbian affairs.[17]

As Robin Kelly notes, to appreciate fully Black working-class resistance to racism it is necessary to look "underneath" formal organizations—unions, churches, civil rights organization—to what he calls the "infrapolitics" of Black street life and culture. He characterizes the resistance in Black working-class popular culture as "alternative" rather than "oppositional."[18] This seems to be true of the Blueswomen and their working-class clientele. Subcultures create a space for developing and expressing worldviews that defy the conventions of the dominant society. On the other hand, once members of an oppressed group attempt to enter into that world, to contest for power or place, they become vulnerable to pressures toward conformity. And the more dependent they are on winning allies from powerful groups, the more vulnerable they are to these pressures. Only when oppressed people have a base in powerful social movements, can they fully challenge hegemonic worldviews and create their own.

The Blueswomen expressed one side of Black resistance and reflected, in culture, what many working-class women coming into the city expressed in their daily lives as they took advantage of new opportunities for work and for leisure. In their own communities, working-class Black women and men were more free to discount and defy white and middle-class norms of respectability. While opening up space for sexual expression, the Blueswomen's defiance could not constitute a basis for contestation with the surrounding white supremacist order. Indeed, they threatened to undermine the claims to respectability so central to the politics of the Black middle class.

Not surprisingly, the Blueswomen met strong opposition from the clubwomen and other Black middle-class spokespeople. The growing numbers of Black working-class women migrating to the cities, their increasing assertiveness, discretionary income, and, most particularly, their enjoyment of dance halls and cabarets, fueled what amounted to a moral panic in the Black middle class.[19] According to Hazel Carby, "the migrating Black woman could be variously situated as a threat to the progress of the race; a threat to the establishment of a respectable Black middle class; a threat to congenial Black and white middle-class

relations, and a threat to the formation of Black masculinity in an urban environment."[20] Kimberley Phillips makes the further point that this "politics of displacement" was also a reaction to the intensified racism and rising tide of segregation experienced by the Black community during this period. The black middle class and elites responded to the increased threat by displacing blame from whites, whom they could not control, onto the Black working class, whom they could hope to manage.[21]

There were other strategies of resistance besides the defiance of the Blueswomen and the uplift organizing of the middle-class African-American clubwomen. Black working-class women also formed women's organizations.[22] These organizations, in contrast to those of the Black middle class, approached working-class communities less through projects of moral education and social service and more through projects of collective self-organization—consumer cooperatives, mutual aid and benevolent associations, housewives' leagues, and consumer boycott campaigns (such as the "Don't Buy Where You Can't Work" campaign), and women's auxiliaries to labor unions.[23] In spite of these different organizing strategies, working class women's organizations appear also to have adopted collective identities that emphasized respectability and women's contribution to the race through family and community work.[24] The need to contain and control Black women's sexuality in the interest of race advancement continued to be a theme of both working-class and middle-class Black women's organizations throughout the twentieth century. The Black women's organizations of the 1950s had much the same negative response to rock and roll as their predecessors had to the Blueswomen.[25]

Working-class Black churches, like their middle-class counterparts, were also caught up in the surveillance of women's sexuality and sexual autonomy.[26] Yet, in other respects, working-class churches broke with middle-class norms. Working-class congregations were crucial sites of support for labor organizing in contrast to the Black middle-class churches, whose congregants tended to have ties to white urban elites—philanthropists, businessmen, and politicians.[27] Even more striking, there was far more room in working-class churches for women to play leadership roles, including as preachers. However, despite their rebellious stance toward the Black middle class and toward white employers, working-class churchwomen adamantly sought to police other Black women's sexual expression.[28]

Both middle-class and working-class Black women struggled to create a feminine identity over against white supremacist cultural constructions

of their bodies as degraded and dangerous and adopted some of the same strategies. But these strategies appear to have expressed somewhat different dilemmas. For the Black middle class, the referent of their actions with respect to and on behalf of the poor was the white world they aspired to enter. They made alliances with white elites when they could, they acted as brokers across the race divide, and they had a strong interest in ensuring that the Black working class did not threaten their hard-earned and fragile social positions.[29] Black working-class churchwomen's efforts at sexual containment had less to do with matronizing moral uplift or with a "politics of displacement" than with a real contest between men and women within the working class over the claims that women could make on men. The life of the street, of public spaces away from home and church, offered freedom to women but also to men.[30] The strains of poverty made it difficult to keep families together and the consequences of separation were far more harsh for women than for men. Offering the church as an alternative site for emotional expressiveness and release, these working-class women may have hoped to bind men more closely to them. Where they stressed responsibility, commitment, and community, the culture of the street celebrated a break from the constraints of alienated work and perhaps even family obligation. On the other hand, the clubs, dance halls, and bars where Black working-class men and women pursued pleasure and leisure also provided income (licit and illicit) for working-class women. And, for many young women, these were arenas for sexual experimentation and courtship.[31]

Working-class as well as middle-class Black women counterposed to the individualistic self-expression of sexuality and the street a more communal ideal of maternal authority based in caring for family and community. The image of the strong Black mother has powerfully shaped Black women's struggle for self-definition. In her book *Fighting Words*, Patricia Hill Collins criticizes what she terms the paradigm of individual sacrifice for women that can border on exploitation. Norms of racial solidarity have placed Black women in the position of being traitors to the race if they appear to put themselves first.[32] Black women have been more successful in naming and challenging the gender, race, and economic exploitation and discrimination they suffered at the hands of white-dominated institutions than at disentangling the gender oppression that weaves through the respect, admiration, personal influence, and even social power conferred on them by their roles as community workers and strong Black mothers.[33]

Class, motherhood and sexuality

The strong mother/community-worker roles of Black women are replicated, in different guises, in other communities of color but also in white working-class communities. In this next section I explore the similarities, across racial/ethnic divides, in working-class women's strategies for making gender identities. I argue that the same tension between claiming respect on the basis of motherhood, on the one hand, and women's sexual self-expression, on the other hand—a tension which has historically shaped Black women's struggle for self-definition—is also present in white working-class women's lives. In this context, I trace out some connections between working-class women's investments in maternal honor and the heterosexism that working-class lesbians have so painfully experienced and described.

There are, of course, historically constructed differences in the cultures, family/household patterns, and maternal roles of different racial/ethnic communities. For example, as Patricia Hill Collins and Paula Gunn Allen argue, Native Americans and African Americans have carried with them, from their precapitalist communities of origin, communal traditions that women could draw on, traditions that gave them more ground for exercising autonomy in the public worlds of their communities.[34] The extended kin networks of Chicano and Asian-American communities, like those of Southern white and many European immigrant communities, had origins in more patriarchal agrarian economies.[35]

Women moving into community work and public roles have faced more or less opposition from men depending, at least in part, on these differences within the cultures of their communities.[36] But all working-class people, white as well as people of color, have needed to rely on cross-household networks to organize exchanges of goods and labor as a fundamental strategy for survival.[37] Because these networks are based on combining waged and unwaged work and especially rely on women's labor and social skills, they are a material base for the development of gender identities and a working-class community culture which confers honor on women as strong mothers who endure. White working-class women have not been "angels in the house." And as Dorothy Allison makes so poignantly clear, the women in her family have felt pulled to support their men, over against a world which disempowers and disrespects them, even at the women's own expense, in a tangle of sympathy for men and a need for men's income.[38]

All women of color are sexual Others in white-supremacist culture, defined, in one way or another (geisha, squaw, tropical bombshell, hot mama) as (hetero)sexually available. Men of color are made Other by being hyper-masculinized (Blacks and Latinos) or emasculated/feminized (Asians).[39] Class difference, on the other hand, is a much less central theme in contemporary representational culture and other public discourses. In the hegemonic cultural construction of class in America, there are only three classes: the (white) rich, the (white) middle class, and the (Black and brown) poor. Class is so thoroughly racialized that white poverty (and even the working class as a distinct group) virtually disappears. Yet, for this very reason, "white trash" remains a powerful slur that haunts white working-class women.

The connections between erotic fantasy, desire, fear, and relations of domination in Western culture are too complex to take on here. So also is the exploration of "trash" identity and how it works as a cultural discourse. I just want to point out that the cultural denigration of poor people and the sexualization of poor women works as a "controlling image" for white working-class women in ways that are parallel, although not identical, to the "controlling images" that women of color have confronted and resisted in their struggle for self-definition. I want to suggest that the powerful identification with and use of mothering by working-class women is constructed out of both the opportunities for exercising authority internal to the community and the dangers of claiming sexual desire, inside and outside it. Additionally, sexuality and motherhood are culturally constructed as oppositions. So for women to build identities around socially valorized ideals of motherhood and caring work inevitably pushes them in the direction of sexual self-denial. Assertion of sexual desire (especially sexual desire outside its containment in romantic love and marriage) is also an acknowledgement of self-need that threatens to disrupt the basis of personal authority located in women's caring for others first.

Evelynn Hammonds argues that the silencing and self-silencing of Black women's sexuality makes Black lesbians outsiders in their own community.[40] Patricia Hill Collins speculates that one of the sources of resistance to Black feminism among Black women is its association with lesbianism, interpreted as a desire to separate from men. The significance of Christianity for African-American women and the thoroughgoing homophobia of Black nationalist politics reinforce women's rejection of homosexuality.[41] Without denying the influences Collins identifies, I think that Hammonds has captured something powerful in

linking the suppression of female sexual desire more generally to Black women's fear of lesbian sexuality. Several Chicana writers make a similar argument about the splitting of femininity between the maternal and the sexual in Chicano culture. In her maternal body, the Chicana is honored and trusted. In her sexual body, the Chicana is dangerous, a potential traitor to her people.[42] If embracing the maternal requires a denial of sexual desire and agency, then the lesbian, who is defined by her desiring, and by her lack of sexual interest in men, represents what must be suppressed—a female sexuality that is not under the control of or in the service of men. Although the madonna/whore split is pervasive in Western culture, it takes on another layer of meaning in working-class and racially oppressed communities where motherwork holds people together and group loyalty is crucial for survival.

White working-class women's association, in the dominant culture, with dangerous, perverse sexuality similarly privileges maternal strength and endurance over against sexual self-expression as the locus of adult women's identities. As Bev Skeggs shows in her longitudinal ethnographic study of a group of white working-class women she first met in a vocational training course, working-class women have to negotiate a difficult path to becoming respectable *and* heterosexual.[43] For working-class women, living in the shadow of their "white trash" figurations, heterosexuality produces simultaneously normalization and marginalization. The distinction between women who enjoy and are in control of sex and those who are more innocent maps onto the distinction between respectable and unrespectable women. Not all of the women negotiated these dilemmas in the same way. Still, they all had to confront and work through the conflation of class shame and sexual shame.[44]

The women's class affected their identities primarily in the ways that they actively disidentified with being working class. Unable either to leave their class position or to engage in a collective resistance to their conditions of life, the women turned to "respectability and responsibility as a means of establishing a valued and legitimate way of being and of being seen."[45] This strategy in turn, Skeggs argues, placed lesbian sexuality even further off limits. To take up a lesbian identity, particularly insofar as lesbians were seen to be part of a "middle-class" sexual counter-culture which affirmed individual choice and sexual self-expression, woud run counter to women's prior investments in caring, family, and motherhood.[46]

Dorothy Allison, writing from a different context—growing up poor white in the South—explores with compassion and insight the

consequences of what Skeggs describes as the "inability *to be* without shame, humiliation and judgement." It was only once Allison's family left the South Carolina Piedmont's rigid class structure, where opportunities for "passing" or "moving up" were nonexistent, that she came to realize possibilities beyond being locked into her "white trash" identity. The women in Skeggs's study had more, but not much more, room to negotiate their identities. Their vocational training and occupations—as daycare workers, home health workers, nurses' aides—provided a vehicle for, and in fact encouraged, them to see themselves as skilled, responsible, and therefore respectable. The women in Allison's family could not get out from under being the "bad poor."[47] They understood that their sexuality had exchange value, and found ways to use it, on the job as well as off it. This, of course, further undermined their possibilities for claiming sexual virtue and respectability. It was one of the reasons, Allison argues, that they clung so fiercely to their racism. They worked as waitresses and counter girls, but they refused to work as maids. Participating in a rigid racial division of gendered labor, they used avenues open to them by institutionalized racism and white supremacy to create self-worth and claim respect.[48]

These examples highlight the connection between collective group organization and identity formation. They also show how social structures constrain the possibilities for collective organization and therefore constrain the range of understandings and ways of positioning oneself available for any individual in the group to take up.[49] Individual women's biographies and particular experiences shaped how they managed the dilemmas and contradictions that they faced in developing their gender identities. But the range of interpretations that could make sense of their dilemmas—and the feelings/emotions they generated—was shaped by the culture and everyday relationships of their social life, the groups of people with whom they lived and worked, and on whom they relied for day-to-day survival. And the culture of the group was, in turn, shaped by the history, the successes and failures, of broader collective struggle, as well as the possibilities for collective action in the present. Constructions and accounts of oneself which reverse the judgements of the dominant society—in the case of white working-class women, the bourgeois ideology that holds individuals responsible for their positions in the economic, social, and cultural hierarchy—are only possible in the context of lived, socially supported, collective resistance.

In their struggle to assert self-worth and claim respect, women of color can draw on collective identities which are reproduced and

reinforced not only in everyday life but through political organization and contestation. However differently inflected by class, discourses of race and ethnicity, negative and positive, are central in contemporary culture and politics. Although weakened and divided (more on this below), organizations defending people of color are visibly part of the political scene. For white working-class women, by contrast, there is much less support for challenging hegemonic cultural constructions. There is no working-class-based politics, no broad-based working-class movements, not even in recent memory, and thus no powerful counter-discourse through which to claim a valued working-class identity. There is still, of course, resistance. The working-class women in Skeggs' study found ways to support each other in defending themselves from "put downs" and making fun of people who thought they "were better than us." Nonetheless, in the absence of a working-class oppositional culture, the possibilities for white working-class women to make a radical break with white, middle-class definitions of respectability and self-worth are narrow indeed.

For the white working-class women examined here, trade unions were not an important part of their work or community worlds. In trade unions, women workers can develop cultures of solidarity and group support for feminine identities which challenge middle-class denigration of their life choices and self-presentation. Of course, there is nothing automatic about such a development. At least historically, the masculinist culture of the male-dominated trade-union movement has tended to support the association between sexual virtue and respectable white working-class womanhood. On the other hand, trade unions have also from time to time provided an arena for women to struggle with working-class men about gender roles. And there are examples from labor history of working-class women publicly enacting an unruly sexuality, sometimes with support from their "brother" unionists: notably, within the context of militant trade-union struggles where women were present not only as supportive wives but as workers themselves.[50]

White working-class women, like women of color, have struggled not only with men but with each other about the meanings of their sexualities within a context shaped profoundly by their class location. They have resisted and accepted, redefined and denied, hegemonic constructions of their sexual selves within life-worlds shaped by their working-class kin, friends, and communities. Conflicts around the sexual containment of women have been intimately bound up with individual and group strategies for responding to their class-based economic, social, and political exclusion and marginalization.

It is certainly crucial that feminists investigate the relations of power and privilege created by institutionalized racism so that we can address them. However, it is also crucial to incorporate class into feminist analysis far more thoroughly than has yet been done.[51] To ignore white working-class women in feminist theorizing of intersectionality and to fail to address the *specificity* of working-class women of color inhibits our political imagination. It highlights those divisions among women which provide the *least* potential common ground—the division between white middle-class (especially upper professional and managerial) women and poor and working-class women of color. An intersectional analysis that includes class location as a key term can open up new fields for cross-race coalition-building and feminist theorizing. It leads us to see that welfare rights and immigrant rights organizing can be feminist projects.[52] It makes trade-union organizing campaigns, workplace organizing around issues of race/gender discrimination, cross-border organizing support campaigns, protests against the institutions of the new world economic order, such as the World Trade Organization, key sites of feminist political work.[53] It brings working-class women's community struggles—for example, over housing, toxic waste and pollution—and the possibilities for coalition-building across communities around these issues into the center of feminist politics.[54] But developing an anti-racist working-class feminism is not only about the issues we organize around—for example, economic issues in contrast with sexual politics. After all, working-class women get breast cancer, need abortions, and are sexually assaulted. An anti-racist working-class feminist politics is defined by how activists organize around any issue. The way we understand the problem, who we see as allies, the solutions we propose, must address the concerns and interests of all working-class women.

The development of an anti-racist working-class feminist politics is the only basis for a renewed feminist movement. As I have argued at various points in this book, the great mobilization of the second wave achieved historic gains without directly confronting capitalist class interests. This was true also of the civil rights movement. Today, both movements face a similar impasse. In the next section, I consider how the dynamics of the capitalist economy and the powers of the capitalist class have shaped the political prospects of our movements.

Capitalist Class Power and the Politics of Resistance

The civil rights and feminist movements combined revolutionary and reformist aims, their radical wings seeking to redistribute economic and political power. Though falling far short of this goal, the movements did dismantle the old gender and racial orders and opened the field for other movements against oppression (for example, gay/lesbian rights, disability rights). They have made it possible for a new left challenge, when it develops, to be far more self-consciously and powerfully anti-racist, anti-sexist, and anti-heterosexist than any that has gone before.[55] On the other hand, by almost any measure, neither racial oppression nor male domination have disappeared from the scene. They have, however, been fundamentally reorganized. Both operate, now, not through an explicit, legally and culturally authorized system of exclusion, but through a process of incorporation that systemically reproduces disadvantage. Elsewhere in this book I have made the argument for this claim in the case of male dominance. Here, I briefly recapitulate it, and then lay out the parallel for the reorganization of institutionalized racism.

The exclusion of women from higher-paid occupations and the male-breadwinner/female-housewife family, which underwrote patriarchal power, have been overturned. Yet male dominance continues, because feminism has been signally unable to win significant changes in the organization of social reproduction. Caregiving remains the privatized responsibility of family/households. No matter how women restrict their childbearing, the needs of adults and children continue to weigh heavily on their shoulders. Women in the upper reaches of the class structure—women in the higher professions and management positions—can buy their way out of responsibilities, but most women cannot. Men and women are negotiating different kinds of bargains about how to share caregiving responsibilities.[56] But so long as these responsibilities remain individual rather than social, households will be forced to organize a division of labor around them and women will continue to be disadvantaged relative to men in the labor market. Further, so long as solo motherhood remains so very difficult, while women will choose it when they need to, the double burdens of being a breadwinner and caregiver will continue to underwrite not only a backward-looking political and cultural nostalgia about the nuclear family but also women's investments in and tolerance for reformed, but still "patriarchal," bargains in family households.[57]

The forces arrayed against changing this underpinning of male dominance are formidable. To make social reproduction a more collective responsibility would require a serious redistribution of wealth. Thus, I argued, feminism's next wave will have to make common cause with and be part of a broad, anticapitalist, rainbow movement, including trade unions that are truly social-movement organizations.

In her analysis of the impasse facing Black feminism, Patricia Hill Collins argues similarly that the gains of the civil rights and feminist movements have contributed to a reorganization of the racial order rather than the demise of institutionalized racism and racialized politics. Although successful in breaking down the explicit, legalized, and culturally sanctioned segregation that defined the horizons of Black life for over a century, the civil rights movement, like the feminist movement, has not been able to improve significantly the lives of the majority of Black people, while opening up previously unthinkable opportunities for a relatively small group. Class divisions among Black women have grown wider. The upward mobility of the Black middle class has weakened the community base of the civil rights movement, and the visible success of some Black women obscures and mystifies the continuing systemic and institutionalized racism that disadvantages the majority. Increased access to political, residential, and employment spaces for some Black women, she argues, is paired with the intractable impoverishment of the majority. Further, the breakup of Black civil society—the loss of institutions that developed in the segregated communities which defined Black life up through the civil rights era—have undermined the practices, such as community work, that fostered a Black women's tradition of resistance.[58]

To address this new impasse, Collins says, Black feminists have to recommit themselves to supporting, organizing for, and representing the needs of working-class and poor Black women. She argues secondly for a break from the sexism and homophobia that have infused Afrocentrism, calling for a racial solidarity that is sensitive to Black heterogeneity and difference and prepared to engage in principled coalitions.[59]

Thus, the problems facing the feminist and civil rights movements are parallel. In both instances, tremendous gains for the middle class are matched by continuing difficulties for an increasingly impoverished working class.[60] My point is not at all to refocus our attention on class to the exclusion of race or gender. The persistence of race and gender discrimination is well documented, even for the middle class.[61] Many African Americans' foothold in the middle class is certainly more

tenuous than that of white men. While having moved out of the urban ghettos, Black people live in segregated suburbs that are less affluent than white suburbs.[62] Still, the rise of a Black intelligentsia, of Black professionals, political office holders, corporate managers, and high-level state administrators is a historic change. The question remains, though, why hasn't it been possible for the Black working class to take advantage of the same openings? For the African-American working class to reach even the distressed levels of the white working class would require a serious redistribution of income and wealth, through expansion of public investment in communities and housing, in schooling and access to higher education, and by the creation of living-wage jobs. If the potential for state intervention to end Black poverty was undermined by racism during the 1960s,[63] it surely will not be fulfilled until the political balance of forces is shifted decisively leftward and with a much more heightened awareness of how institutionalized racism has scuttled previous efforts. The way out of the impasse facing the Black working class cannot be found in reinvigorating the political thrust of the single-issue politics of the 1960s. At least in its assimilationist goals, that strategy has come up against structural and political limits. The successful political campaigns against affirmative action; the re-invigorated racist political discourses around crime, welfare, and immigration; the cutbacks in spending for social services and housing—these are not a simple "political backlash," a pendulum-swing to the right which is bound to move back. They are the political effects of profound changes in the economy. The drift of politics in the U.S. steadily to the right over the past twenty years will only be halted by a broad-based, multi-issue movement that combines the forces of many different groups in order to confront capital's formidable political and economic power.

The civil rights revolution failed to carry the majority of Black people into the mainstream of the U.S. economy because, to put it simply, by the time the Black working class finally got a ticket to ride the train that had carried other excluded groups into the mainstream, the train was no longer running. As Karen Brodkin so persuasively shows, in the post-Second World War era, the combination of government intervention (especially the GI bill and housing programs) and unprecedented economic growth and prosperity laid the basis for the men of previously denigrated and excluded ethnic groups, and particularly Jews, to "become white."[64] The war against fascism had perhaps helped to undermine popular anti-Semitism, but we should not put too much

weight on this factor. In many communities prejudice toward Jews remained quite strong, even after the war. Yet although the anti-communist right fulminated against Jews, by the early 1950s, in the context of a booming economy and what amounted to an affirmative action program which addressed broad segments of the working class, their anti-Semitism had little political purchase. However, Blacks were systematically denied access to the government programs that provided suburban home-ownership, college education, and thus occupational upward mobility for many working-class ethnic males.[65] The gains made by ethnic groups of European origin, accrued in the 1950s, were passed down to the next generations and then used to sustain racist myths about the inferiority of Black culture.

By the time the civil rights movement finally won for Black people even a small part of the kind of consistent federal support that had propelled Jews and other "Euro-American" men into the middle class and across the color line, the economic conditions that had allowed for such upward mobility were about to disappear. Almost as the movements were coming into their own—from the mid-1960s through the early 1970s—the U.S. economy was entering into a sea change which culminated in the current reconfiguration and dominance of capitalist class power. As the postwar hegemony of U.S. corporate capital began to give way with the rise of new and quite powerful international competitors, profit margins began to narrow, and the corporations launched an offensive on wages and working conditions as a strategy to restore profits.[66] The bureaucratized labor unions were totally unprepared for this "new class war" and unwilling to take the risks involved in breaking away from the corporatist strategies that had allowed them to build their organizations in the period of prosperity.[67] The employers' offensive sparked defensive rank-and-file revolts and an upsurge in militancy in the early 1970s. But, with the exception of the Black revolutionary union movements in Detroit, these revolts only rarely connected with the student, civil rights, feminist, and antiwar movements of their time. And they failed to shift fundamentally the "business union" strategies of their ossified union leaderships. By the 1980s, many corporations had turned away from squeezing manufacturing workers to simply dumping them altogether. Deindustrialization in the old centers of production, movement of manufacturing to the south and overseas, then the emergence of more flexible production processes and outsourcing—all pushed organized workers further onto the defensive.[68] There were many inspiring struggles by working-class communities in these years.

And some activists, as they reached out across the country for support, found new allies among the other movements, in the course of their struggle expanding and even radicalizing their own political worldviews.[69] But these battles were almost all lost. Plants just shut down. And if they didn't, the employers were able to force workers into harsh bargains that included wage cuts, changes in work rules, loss of control over schedules, speed-ups, and so on. Between 1980 and 1984, union membership in the private sector declined from 20.1 percent to 15.6 percent of the workforce. By 1996 only 10.2 percent of workers in private industry were unionized.[70]

As the old industrial centers died, so did the communities dependent on them. This was, of course, especially fateful for Black urban communities dependent on stable, unionized working-class jobs.[71] During the 1970s, while affirmative-action policy and anti-discrimination legislation was opening up opportunities for higher education and professional/managerial employment to middle-class white women and people of color, good blue-collar jobs were disappearing. Urban renewal and deindustrialization, along with expanding opportunities for residential mobility for Blacks who had the means to move out further, undermined the economic base of inner-city neighborhoods. White flight and suburbanization did the rest of the job, so by the time Black urban residents were able to use the political muscle won through their civil rights struggle, they found themselves holding power in cities with a shrinking economic base in states where legislatures were increasingly hostile.

The political hostility, the intensified and racialized conflict between suburb and city, and the movement of white working-class communities away from the Democratic Party also had their roots in the employers' offensive.[72] The civil rights and women's movements really did threaten white male monopolies. Although this challenge would have always produced resistance, economic expansion, such as in the post-Second World War years, which saw real improvements in the standards of living of almost all working-class people, would also have softened the blow and helped to undercut the racist appeals of the right. Instead, working-class communities faced declining wages, job loss, shrinking opportunities, and increasing economic insecurity. Increasing economic competition intensifies reliance on existing group solidarities, solidarities that arise out of the ways that people come together to organize their everyday survival. These survival projects, organized through kin and other social networks as well as in the workplace, will in the ordinary course of events reproduce rather than disrupt the occupational and residential racial/ethnic segregation which is the basis for racial/ethnic conflict. To be clear: this is not an argument against anti-racism political strategies or for supposedly "universal" as opposed to "targeted" government programs. It is rather to say that economic and political conditions are related, that the past gains were made under conditions which will not return, and that a new anti-racism offensive will only be possible if it is tied to an anticapitalist politics—allied to a broad coalition for economic and social justice.

Without the capacity to organize a collective response to the employers' offensive, white working-class people inevitably were mobilized to hold onto whatever advantages they could command, displacing their anger and fear onto the most vulnerable and powerless segments of society. Obviously, this is not the first time racist appeals and scapegoating have successfully divided U.S. working people.

In the absence of a more collective and inclusive response to economic instability, group resentment and political mobilization on the basis of narrow group interests are the order of the day. Omi and Winant make the point that even if white racism is deeply rooted, nonetheless a white backlash was not inevitable. "A more comprehensive series of reforms, for example, might have extended to redistribution initiatives and full-employment commitments, which could have cushioned the blow that whites located in marginal neighborhoods, school districts, jobs, etc. received when affirmative action and similar programs increased competition for semiskilled work, public education, and affordable housing."[73] Of course, the major cause of white workers' deteriorating living standards was the employers' offensive against workers' wages, jobs, and working conditions, an assault which weighed even more heavily on the Black working class. However, the policies and programs that would have helped protect workers from the consequences of this assault were certainly not in the cards. As the economic room for contesting corporate power shrank, so did the political space for countering corporate interests. A full-employment policy, proposed during the 1970s and 1980s by the trade unions to soften the blows of dislocation and to strengthen the bargaining position of workers, never got off the ground. Instead, federally enforced legal protections for organizing were gutted.[74]

The right's mobilization of racist feelings and ideologies took form not only in an attack on aggressive state intervention to redress racial discrimination (especially campaigns against affirmative action, bilingual

education, etc.) but also in an attack on the public sector more generally—both public-sector workers and users of social-welfare programs (especially clear in welfare reform and anti-immigration legislation). The mobilization of anti-immigrant sentiment has not been limited to the white working class; increasing competition between nonwhite racial/ethnic groups and increasing class division within them has also been the basis for attacks on immigrants as part of a broader assault on the "undeserving" poor.[75]

As the drift to the right has gained momentum, conservative interest groups have been able to capture increasing shares of the state budget. Thus, not only was funding for public services—especially those directed to the poor (in the hegemonic figuration of the class system, an "underclass" made up predominantly of people of color)—generally under attack. The 1980s and 1990s also saw increasing shifts away from social spending and toward spending on the coercive arm of the state—a rise in military spending as a portion of the federal budget and the rapid growth of prisons to the point that it makes sense to speak of a prison-industrial complex.[76]

This rise of the right through a politics of opposition to the "liberal" welfare state also has its origins in the employers' offensive. The expansion of the welfare state began in the 1950s but accelerated in the 1960s as a response to the urban rebellions and the increasingly well-organized groups making claims for state services.[77] Increased government spending, whether at the federal, state, or local level, was never financed by serious transfers of wealth. After averaging 45 percent in the 1950s, corporate tax rates began a sharp decline in the 1960s, reaching 24 percent in 1994.[78] Effective tax rates on the incomes of the wealthy were only very mildly redistributive and since the mid-1970s have become much less so.[79] The burden of funding for the U.S. welfare state falls on wage and salary incomes—a system of financing which emerged from the defeat of more interventionist strategies. Although during the 1930s there was real debate in policy circles over strategies to manage the economy, by the end of the Second World War an interventionist model of the state had been decisively marginalized in favor of what has been called "growth liberalism."[80] In this approach, government's role is confined to using fiscal power—its capacity to tax and spend—to maintain purchasing power and to fuel economic expansion. Management of the economy through wage-setting, powerful regulatory institutions, or publicly owned production was rejected in favor of demand stimulation and restrained social welfare spending. In

comparison to the social-democratic regimes that emerged in many other capitalist economies, the postwar accord between labor and capital created a segmented system of income security, pensions, and health benefits. Unionized workers earned pension and health benefits through their contracts, leaving those in the lower tiers of the working class dependent on the public sector.[81]

This system worked relatively well during the prosperous postwar boom years. A rising tide did lift all boats, although not equally, and it was possible to build a "guns and butter" state through taxing the working class and middle class. With real income rising, taxation did not loom large as a political issue. The employers' offensive, however, quickly exposed the fundamental weaknesses of this foundation for welfare-state liberalism. During the 1970s, while median real family income declined by 16 percent, taxes increased as a proportion of workers' income. The revolts against property taxes in the late 1970s were simply the beginning of a successful conservative mobilization around the issue of taxation and spending.[82]

The conservative movement that emerged in the 1970s but took over U.S. politics in the 1980s was an alliance of two overlapping but distinct political movements. The religious right created its strength out of the Christian churches and on the basis of a backlash against feminism and gay/lesbian rights movements. The modernizing right has staked its claim much more firmly in a classic liberal political worldview. Thus, their neoliberalism has incorporated the individual-rights discourses of the civil rights movements rearticulated as the right to fair competition on the market. Although the religious right has caused feminism and the gay/lesbian movement a lot of pain, the real conservative success story lies in the dominance of the modernizing right's worldview. Clinton's rhetoric on welfare in the 1992 campaign captured this shift very well, particularly the celebration of work as a moral issue (working mothers are good role models who break the "cycle of dependence"), which reproduced rather than challenged the now standard and pervasive representation of Black poor single mothers as undeserving welfare queens. The modernizing right's discourse depends on the contrast between the deserving—those who wish to make it through their own efforts (a hand up)—and the undeserving—namely, those who argue for group support (a hand out). Efforts by the government to improve the lives of people collectively are delegitimized by this framing. Instead, the role of the state is to "help" those who need it to enter into the market and to enjoy the supposedly equal opportunities for upward

mobility awaiting those willing to make the effort. While New Democrats put a slightly more populist spin on this basic conservative message, they have essentially adopted it. As civil rights and women's organizations are forced to struggle on this terrain, they have pragmatically adapted to the limits of available discourses, reproducing rather than challenging the conservative terms of the debate.

As I argued in my analysis of the political consensus on welfare reform, the "middle-class" representatives advocating for communities of color—directors of nonprofit organizations, social-service providers, public health workers, and so on—shifted their political strategies in response to the rapid decline of support for government investments in their communities. Navigating within increasingly conservative political waters and without a politically mobilized social base, they adapted their political rhetoric and demands to suit the times. Mainstream civil rights organizations have joined with Black conservatives and Black nationalists to justify social-service programs in terms of their value for morally uplifting the Black working class, now redefined as an underclass. This shift has also been fueled by a masculinist political current that has been historically dominant in communities of color.[83] The crisis of the Black male, like the panic about (Black) teen pregnancy, comes to justify state funding for services that target behavioral reform.[84] Whatever successes advocates may have in grasping some of the shrinking state funds for their own programs, they pay for these gains in reinforcing the very ideologies which have justified funding cutbacks in the first place. That is, the focus on the "bad character" of the "underclass" supports eliminating hard-won public programs, now disparaged as entitlements that breed "dependence" in favor of the bracing independence and self-help of the market economy. At the same time, as Barbara Omolade argues, political statements, such as the Million Man March, which mobilize around themes of Black male responsibility, strike a responsive emotional chord among women who struggle with single parenthood and extremely conflictual gender relations.[85] Here, too, we see the political consequences of our movements' failure to wrest concessions from the state that would lighten women's burdens of caregiving.

Advocates' failure to move resources into their communities leaves their working-class base stranded.[86] The pattern of dramatic class cleavage within the Black community has been repeated in many others as a consequence of global capitalist restructuring, and the recent wave of immigration to the U.S., particularly into "Asian" and "Latino" communities. Bringing very different cultural capitals and economic resources with them, and in certain instances benefiting from large federal subsidies, some new immigrants have done quite well, while many others have filled the ranks of the expanding working class.[87] At the same time, political openings in the state apparatus and elective offices increase opportunities for individuals to play a brokering role as representatives of their respective racial/ethnic groups. New relationships between the local state and urban racial/ethnic enclaves have created more complex power structures internally, while at the same time increasing competition among racial/ethnic groups jockeying for position with regard to public spending and investments.[88]

The working classes in these communities have spoken politically and sporadically through riots/rebellions, mobilizations for immigrant rights, community–labor coalitions around union organizing drives, and other grassroots struggles.[89] But their voices are muted compared to those of their middle-class spokespeople.[90]

To understand, then, both the gains and impasses of the civil rights and women's movements, their ability to challenge so thoroughly and to change ways of thinking about race and gender and their inability to sustain this challenge, it is helpful to put them in the context of the periods of capitalist economic transformation. The economic changes that were already reshaping the political landscape in the 1970s and 1980s accelerated in the 1990s: the expansion of markets and production, the increase in labor migration both within and across national borders, the flexibility and mobility of investment/production, the penetration of global firms into the U.S. economy not only in goods but in services, the increasing freeing of global firms from control and regulation by national states. The capitalist restructuring that first undermined the conditions of blue-collar workers in core manufacturing industries now threatens security and stability of jobs in many sectors—from middle-managers and supervisors to production workers.

At the core of these changes are not simply globalization but capital's increasing flexibility, mobility, and concentrated power, as well as the intensity of capitalist competition and the employers' drive to squeeze ever more out of the workforce. A highly competitive and turbulent economy now dominates life in the U.S. As in the significant periods of capitalist restructuring that preceded this one, the institutions of working-class political and economic defense that had been built up under the old paradigm and that might have worked (although not all that well) previously are now utterly unable to respond to new conditions.

Until some alternatives develop, the political hegemony of the modernizing right can be expected to remain in place.

Even if no quick or easy solution seems to be on the horizon, the situation is not without realistic hopes and expectations for renewed contestation and political organization. The U.S. working class has become more immigrant, more racially/ethnically diverse, more low-waged, and more female. And the trade unions, although weak in terms of the percentage of the labor force who are members of unions, are groping toward new, more militant, more democratic, more political, and more community-based modes of struggle. In response to global capital's vicious exploitation of the environment as well as the workforce, coalitions of environmental groups and trade unions have been formed.[91] Labor is changing partly because it has no choice, partly because new groups of workers have organized within the trade unions to make new demands: gay/lesbian workers have organized for their unions to take a stand on and contribute to campaigns for lesbian/gay rights; feminist union members have forced their unions to "come out" for abortion rights, to see support for these rights as a union issue; immigrants are organizing. Grassroots worker solidarity organizations, like Jobs With Justice, have built international labor solidarity and raised the consciousness of U.S. workers through cross-border organizing campaigns.[92] New community-based organizations which bridge trade-union organizing with struggles for racial justice have emerged.[93] For the first time there is a real possibility for a coalitional politics, for a rainbow movement organized around a broad agenda of social and economic justice.[94] Of course, there are currents running in a very different direction, and they are, right now, the stronger. Still, we, all of us who won't settle for what the powerful intend, have no choice but to stake our future on this possibility, engaging in the "visionary pragmatism"[95] that has animated resistance to oppression and the struggle for justice in every generation.

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Notes

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1. For the following analysis, see Kimberlé Crenshaw, "Whose Story is it Anyway? Feminist and Antiracist Appropriations of Anita Hill," in Toni Morrison, ed., *Race-ing Justice, En-gendering Power: Essays on Anita Hill, Clarence Thomas, and*

the Construction of Social Reality (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992), 402–40; and Elsa Barkley Brown, "'What Has Happened Here': The Politics of Difference in Women's History and Feminist Politics," in Linda Nicholson, ed., *The Second Wave: A Reader in Feminist Theory* (New York: Routledge, 1997).
2. Barbara Omolade, *The Rising Song of African American Women* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 180–202; Deborah Gray White, *Too Heavy a Load: Black Women in Defense of Themselves, 1894–1994* (New York: Norton, 1999), 116–22; Elizabeth Martinez, *De Colores Means All of Us* (Cambridge, Mass.: South End Press, 1998), 172–81; Purvi Shah, "Redefining the Home: How Community Elites Silence Feminist Activism," in Sonia Shah, ed., *Dragon Ladies: Asian American Feminists Breathe Fire* (Boston: South End Press, 1997).
3. Kimberlé Crenshaw, "Intersectionality and Identity Politics: Learning from Violence Against Women of Color," in Mary Lyndon Shanley and Uma Narayan, eds., *Reconstructing Political Theory: Feminist Perspectives*, (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 184.
4. Evelyn Nakano Glenn, "The Social Construction and Institutionalization of Gender and Race: An Integrative Framework," in Myra Marx Ferree, Judith Lorber, and Beth B. Hess, eds., *Revisioning Gender* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1999), 20.
5. For overviews of the issues here, see Erik Olin Wright, *The Debate on Classes* (London: Verso, 1989), and Joan Acker, "Rewriting Class, Race, and Gender: Problems in Feminist Rethinking," in Ferree et al., eds., *Revisioning Gender*, 44–69.
6. Patricia Hill Collins, *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990), esp. chap. 7.
7. See White, *Too Heavy a Load*, e.g. 78, 132–33.
8. Elsa Barkley Brown, "Negotiating and Transforming the Public Sphere: African American Political Life in the Transition from Slavery to Freedom," in Cathy J. Cohen, Kathleen B. Jones, and Joan Tronto, eds., *Women Transforming Politics: An Alternative Reader* (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 358–62.
9. Ibid., 362.
10. White, *Too Heavy a Load*, 132–33; Robin D. G. Kelly, *Race Rebels: Culture, Politics, and the Black Working Class* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 39, 45–47, 83.
11. Linda Gordon, *Pitied But Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 126–43.
12. For the modern period, see Cheryl Townsend Gilkes, "Building in Many Places: Multiple Commitments and Ideologies in Black Women's Community Work," in Ann Bookman and Sandra Morgen, eds., *Women and the Politics of Empowerment* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), 57.
13. White, *Too Heavy a Load*, 69–73.
14. Ibid., 70.
15. Barkley Brown, "What Has Happened Here," 278–80, inc. nn. 25 and 26.
16. Collins, *Black Feminist Thought*, chap. 5.
17. Daphne Duval Harrison, *Black Pearls: Blues Queens of the 1920s* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1990); Angela Y. Davis, *Blues Legacies and Black Feminism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1998).
18. Kelly, *Race Rebels*, 47.
19. See also Tera W. Hunter, "'Work That Body': African-American Women, Work

and Leisure in Atlanta and the New South," in Eric Arnesen, Julie Greene, and Bruce Laurie, eds., *Labor Histories: Class, Politics, and the Working-Class Experience* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998), 155–57; Kevin K. Gaines, *Uplifting the Race: Black Leadership, Politics, and Culture in the Twentieth Century* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), esp. 88–93. For analysis of a similar white middle-class "moral panic" focused on young women in this same period, see Constance A. Nathanson, *Dangerous Passage: The Social Control of Sexuality in Women's Adolescence* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991).

20. Hazel V. Carby, "Policing the Black Woman's Body in an Urban Context," in Cohen et al., *Women Transforming Politics*, 153.
21. Kimberley L. Phillips, "Making a Church Home: African-American Migrants, Religion, and Working-Cass Activism," in Arnesen et al., eds., *Labor Histories*, 234–5. See also Gaines, *Uplifting the Race*, chap. 7. This class-inflected response to newcomers in the context of increasing racism is similar to the response of Jewish middle-class women in England to immigrants from Eastern Europere in the context of intensified English anti-semitism during the early years of the twentieth century. See Susan L. Tananbaum, "Biology and Community: The Duality of Jewish Mothering in East London, 1880–1939," in Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Crace Chang, and Linda Renie Forcey, eds., *Mothering: Ideology, Experience, and Agency* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 311–32.
22. Due to space considerations, I am not including Black working-women's organizations (e.g. professional associations, trade unions) in this essay.
23. See White, *Too Heavy a Load*, 163–68. Darlene Clark Hine, "The Housewives' League of Detroit: Black Women and Economic Nationalism," in Nancy A. Hewitt and Suzanne Lebsock, eds., *Visible Women: New Essays on American Activism* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1993), 222–41; and on mutual aid associations, Kelly, *Race Rebels*, 38.
24. While claiming a working-class identity, the women of the Ladies Auxiliary of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters were in some ways more like, than unlike, the middle-class clubwomen. Many did not work outside the home; a significant number had college degrees. White, *Too Heavy a Load*, 171.
25. Ibid.
26. Phillips, "Making a Church Home," 246–47.
27. Ibid., 247–50.
28. According to Phillips, "The largely female congregation of the Jesus Only Church of God had an elaborate list of prohibitions, including 'adultery, fornication, lying and joking, backbiting, whoremongering, smoking, drinking, chewing tobacco, dipping snuff, dancing in public, wearing lipstick, earrings, beads or short skirts'" (ibid., 247).
29. Gaines, *Uplifting the Race*, 36–46.
30. Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, *Righteous Discontent: The Women's Movement in the Black Baptist Church, 1880–1920* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 204, and "Rethinking Vernacular Culture: Black Religion and Race Records in the 1920s and 1930s," in Wahneema Lubiano, ed., *The House that Race Built* (New York: Vintage, 1998), pp. 157–77. On the masculinist popular culture of the zoot suit years, see Kelly, *Race Rebels*, chap. 7.
31. Kelly, *Race Rebels*, 46–48.
32. Patricia Hill Collins, *Fighting Words: Black Women and the Search for Justice* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 30.

33. See also Kesho Yvonne Scott, *The Habit of Surviving* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1991).
34. Collins, *Feminist Thought*, 119–33; Paula Gunn Allen, *The Sacred Hoop: Recovering the Feminine in American Indian Traditions* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992).
35. Bonnie Thornton Dill, "Fictive Kin, Paper Sons and Compadrazgo: Women of Color and the Struggle for Family Survival," in Maxine Baca Zinn and Bonnie Thornton Dill, eds., *Women of Color in U.S. Society* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), 149–70; Karen Brodkin, *How Jews Became White Folks and What That Says About Race in America* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1998), 124–27.
36. Nancy A. Naples, *Grassroots Warriors: Activist Mothering, Community Work, and the War on Poverty* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 145–6, 152.
37. See Chapter 3 in this volume. See also Karen Brodkin Sacks, "Toward a Unified Theory of Class, Race, and Gender," *American Ethnologist* 16, no. 3 (1989), 534–50; Margaret K. Nelson and Joan Smith, *Working Hard and Making Do: Surviving in Small Town America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
38. Dorothy Allison, *Skin: Talking About Sex, Class, and Literature* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Firebrand Books, 1994), 17.
39. Leith Mullings, *On Our Own Terms: Race, Class, and Gender in the Lives of African American Women* (New York: Routledge, 1997), chap. 6, and "The Pocahontas Perplex: The Image of Indian Woman in American Culture," *Massachusetts Review* 16 (1975), 698–714; Yen Le Espiritu, *Asian American Women and Men: Labor, Laws, and Love* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1997), chap. 5.
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51. For a complementary analysis, see Delia D. Aguilar, "Questionable Claims: Colonialism Redux, Feminist Style," *Race & Class* 41, no. 3 (2000), 1–12.
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69. Ibid., 23–31; Neala J. Schleuning, *Women, Community, and the Hormel Strike of 1985–86* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994).
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72. I am interested here particularly in the inroads of the right in the working-class base, the ways in which race divided working-class people. This is not intended as an overall analysis of the rise of the right in U.S. politics.
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74. Davis, *Prisoners of the American Dream*, 131–35, 138–40.
75. Martinez, *De Colores Means All of Us*, 200–01, 243–44.
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77. Francis Fox Piven, "The Welfare State as Work Enforcer," *Dollars and Sense*, September–October 1999, 32–34.
78. Nancy Folbre and the Center for Popular Economics, *The New Field Guide to the U.S. Economy* (New York: The New Press, 1995), 5.12.
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84. Willie M. Legett, "The Crisis of the Black Male: A New Ideology in Black Politics", and Preston H. Smith, "'Self-Help,' Black Conservatives, and the Reemergence of Black Privatism", both in Reed, ed., *Without Justice for All.*
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eds., *The New Asian Immigration in Los Angeles and Global Restructuring* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994). On class differences and the new immigration, see Jan Lin, *Reconstructing Chinatown: Ethnic Enclave, Global Change* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).

88. On divisions among communities of color, see, for example, "Melvin L. Oliver, James H. Johnson, Jr., and Walter Farrell, Jr., "Anatomy of a Rebellion: A Political-Economic Analysis," in Robert Gooding-Williams, ed., *Reading Rodney King, Reading Urban Uprising* (New York: Routledge, 1993); Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick, "A Repeat Performance? The Nicaraguan Exodus," in Mary Romero, Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, and Vilma Ortiz, eds., *Challenging Fronteras: Structuring Latina and Latino Lives in the U.S.* (New York: Routledge, 1997); Martinez, *De Colores Means All of Us*, 75–80. On the brokering role of the middle-class, see Reed, *Stirrings*; Yen Espiritu and Paul Ong, "Class Constraints on Racial Solidarity among Asian Americans," in Ong et al., *New Asian Immigration*, 295–321.
89. Eric Mann, "Class, Community and Empire: Toward an Anti-Imperialist Strategy for Labor," in Ellen Meiksins Wood, Peter Meiksins, and Michael Yates, eds., *Rising From the Ashes? Labor in the Age of "Global" Capitalism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1998), 100–09; Moody, *Workers in a Lean World*, 170–78.
90. On middle-class bias in Asian-American organizations, see Espiritu and Ong, "Class Constraints."
91. Martinez, *De Colores Means All of Us*, 108–16. For those of us participating in the truly massive demonstrations that disrupted the meetings of the World Trade Organization in Seattle, November 29–30, 1999, this potential for a broad coalition of labor, environment, and social justice groups seemed to be closer to reality than ever.
92. These grassroots organizations as well as the reform movements within the official trade unions, such as Teamsters for a Democratic Union, represent a force for challenging the economic nationalism of the trade-union officialdom (and for winning rank-and-file workers to more internationalist perspectives). For an analysis of these political prospects, see Kim Moody, "Global Capital and Economic Nationalism: Protectionism or Solidarity?" *Against the Current* 14, no. 3 (July–August 2000), 34–38, and "Global Capital and Economic Nationalism: Finding Protection in the Crowd," *Against the Current* 14, no 4 (September–October 2000), 25–29.
93. For example, the Workers Organizing Committee in Portland, Oregon, the Chinese Staff and Worker Association in New York City, the Bus Riders Union in Los Angeles, Black Workers for Justice in Rocky Mountain, North Carolina. Lin, 192–93, Mann, 103–06.
94. For explorations of such a coalitional politics, see Iris Young, "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship," and Bernice Johnson Reagon, "Coalition Politics: Turning the Century," both in Anne Phillips, ed., *Feminism and Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Chela Sandoval, "Mestizaje as Method: Feminists-of-Color Challenge the Canon," in Trujillo, ed., *Living Chicana Theory*, 352–70.
95. I borrow this phrase from Stanlie M. James and Abena P. A. Busia, eds., *Theorizing Black Feminisms: The Visionary Pragmatism of Black Women* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993).

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