

F O U R T H
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WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

DISCUSSION TEXTS 18TH CONGRESS

***Building the Fourth
International in Brazil***

The contributions were submitted to the discussion bulletin before the Bureau meeting of 12/13 October. Further discussion bulletins will be published with later contributions.

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Let us build a broad, democratic and mass International!

Fourth International must remain open to the recomposition with different revolutionary traditions.

1. What international have we been up to now?

A few months before the XVIII World Congress, in an economic, ecological, geopolitical and global correlation of forces of the most difficult of the last 80 years, the Fourth International continues as a pole of reference for the radical left. We managed to become this point of reference and attraction because FI has been shaped in the last five decades as a broad and democratic space – not without explicit rules – for frank and open debates among non-dogmatic Marxists, with the objective of common revolutionary action on reality. In other words, we have constituted ourselves a useful organization, capable of taking initiatives in favor of the workers and peoples.

The programmatic achievements of 1968, as well as those that would come in the 70s made us pioneers in the active absorption of gender and race oppressions' issues, in articulation with class struggle and the rise of oppressed peoples and nations. Next, we had the no less pioneering understanding of the ecological struggle as central to our time. This has been possible thanks to our conception of an open Marxism, of uncertainty, which has allowed us: (1) to remain linked to the most dynamic experiences of mass resistances, in particular of youth, new sectors of the working class, women, peasants and landless movements, in addition to the racialized layers of the world of labor; (2) to understand the tremendous and growing contradiction between the strength of that multiple struggles and the weakness of post-1991 revolutionary political alternatives; (3) to understand the importance of political unity, where possible, with other socialist forces (even reformist), in broad anti-capitalist parties, as an intermediary path for the construction of the much needed revolutionary political alternatives; (4) to learn to respect and absorb the lessons of

new revolutionary experiences, betting on programmatic coincidences and possible syntheses, attracting even currents of revolutionary families different from our tradition.

We have been very active in the alter-globalization initiatives of the beginning of the century, playing a pioneering role in the debate on ecosocialism. The climate and environmental crisis, feminist and anti-racist struggles, which are essentially global and strongly intertwined with the colonial/anticolonial question, are today increasingly central in the recomposition of the world socialist (i.e. non-reformist) left. This explains to a large extent why many groups that are not even of the Trotskyist tradition are seeking dialogue and synthesis with us. In this scenario, it is not at all accidental that we continue to be attractive to sectors of the radical Marxist left of all origins - as comrades and groupings coming from Maoism (in Asia and Latin America) and from other Trotskyist and non-Trotskyist traditions prove.

2. What international organization do we want?

We believe that this opening nature of our international is a great heritage, even more so when the multiple crises of capital and of alternatives of those from below tragically shorten the deadlines for the recomposition of revolutionary leaderships with mass influence.

The complexity of the international situation poses us, of course, new debates of substance. We have within ourselves, it is true – because we are a living organization – differences around very important issues: What is the situation of U.S. imperialism? What is the role of the emerging Chinese imperialism? How to respond to the war expansionism of Russian imperialism without ceasing to denounce NATO? In the confrontation with the extreme right, what do we understand as a united front? What is our strategic and tactical policy vis-à-vis Latin American reformisms and in particular their left wings? However, in none of these polemics the fissures are drawn between old and new FI members,

between “historical” and newly-added comrades, exactly between different branches of the genealogical tree. The debates are raised among all, indistinctly, and no closure or illusory “return to the origins” guarantees a greater possibility of success.

In this context, we see no reason to retreat to self-sufficient positions and renounce the search for the broadest revolutionary unity. So the big question to ask and answer, when it comes to deciding on the incorporation of new organizations to the international, is whether these incorporations collaborate or not for the strengthening of our program and capacity for revolutionary initiative. For all these reasons, it seems to us a serious mistake that, precisely at this moment, proposals of segregation or veto to the incorporation of this or that revolutionary component to the international are raised among us.

We're speaking of MES and Resistencia, from Brazil, which are the largest and most dynamic Trotskyist organizations within the PSOL. But also about RISE, of Southern Ireland, and about groups from Eastern Europe that approached us, and of the also Brazilian APS. Those of us who sign this document are in favor of the full incorporation of the aforementioned organizations, if they so wish, because there are no political-programmatic reasons to keep them away: they are organizations of the socialist tradition, linked to the struggles of the world of labor and the youth, they are not in bourgeois governments nor of class collaboration, they do not support any imperialism (neither the US, nor the Europeans, nor Putin, nor Xi Jin Ping).

In our opinion, the debate on the status of the organizations or currents that have more recently approached the international (from the historical point of view) has to do directly with the type of international that is necessary in the present historical period. Our openness and flexibility, mainly in the face of political families different from our genealogy, has marked us with a differential that, after 1991, with the multiplication

of fragmentations, has contradictorily made us a space for dialogue, a reference for approaches unthinkable in previous decades and a hope of recomposition of the radical left.

We have no doubt that the full incorporation to FI of the above mentioned organizations, with their thousands of militants in Brazil, is a contribution that strengthens our international, first of all, in the country and in Latin America, and, with their construction experiences, all over the world. We have enough maturity and experience in coexistence with diversity to escape the temptation of the somewhat conspiratorial reasoning, according to which the arrival of larger groups puts at risk the “control” of the international by the current leadership or by the “original political family”. Such reasoning is totally opposed to our tradition of openness and search for new syntheses. Moreover, a unity of this dimension is made after a long process of debates, common action and operating agreements.

3. Let the debate on national political orientations continue.

As is widely known in the international, there is a debate in Brazil among section members, sympathizer (MES) and permanent observers (Resistencia and APS) – all part of the Party of Socialism and Freedom (PSOL) – about the relationship with the leadership bloc of the party, which includes differences on the PSOL’s policy towards Lula-Alckmin government. It is also well known that Brazil is not the only country where there are two or more organizations that claim or FI or have relations with us. Thus, it seems sensible to us to propose – as a commitment of the World Congress – that the incorporation of large organizations of the Brazilian PSOL into FI does not automatically change the current situation of debate: there is not and there will not be for now an FI official line the Brazilian PSOL and towards Lula 3.0 government (and the other PT’s governments of class conciliation at the other levels). Besides, of course, the general principles that we defend them against attacks of the extreme right, we do not participate in them and we defend that the PSOL is not part of their governments either. *(See, at the end, after the signatures, an informative complement of responsibility of the Brazilian signatories).*

4. An example: the internationalist activity of the MES

As far as internationalist tasks are concerned, the behavior and contributions of MES (Socialist Left Movement) are expressive. Undoubtedly, the most important advance of MES from the militancy in FI is the absorption of ecosocialism in the program and practice of the comrades, who maintain an important work in the Amazonian state of Pará and now have been direct victims of the greatest climatic disaster in the history of the country, with the floods in Rio Grande do Sul.

The organization reproduces on its web pages all FI resolutions and international campaigns, as well as articles on the situation in countries of the five continents. Representatives of MES leadership participate since 2019, in a constructive way, as guests (upon request), in all the meetings of FI bodies, such as those of the International Committee, the International Bureau and in Latin American meetings. We believe that this participation made them understand better and better how the international works.

Their international leaders closely accompany, in a constructive way for FI, processes such as those of Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Mexico, Cuba, Argentina, Uruguay and the United States. They brought Zakkar Popovitch of Socialny Rukh to Brazil, in the first year of the war in Ukraine, and held meetings with the Ukrainian diaspora in the Brazilian South. They have played a central role, in Brazil, in supporting the visit of the former guerrilla commander Monica Baltodano, as part of the international campaign against the criminal-neoliberal regime of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua.

They have actively supported with a delegation the People’s Summit in Brussels, in July 2023, during the Summit of Latin American and Caribbean presidents with the EU. They also actively supported with a delegation to the Counter Summit of Marrakech in front of the Annual Assembly of the World Bank and the IMF, in October 2023, organized by the comrades of Al Mounadil-a, the CADTM network and other networks. They participated with several FI organizations in the VI International Ecosocialist Meeting and the I Latin American Ecosocialist Meeting, which took place last May in Buenos Aires. Following the orientation from the IC and

from meetings of FI in Latin America, they were involved with a wide deployment of energy in the preparation of the I International Anti-Fascist Conference, which was planned for Porto Alegre for May 17 to 19, 2024, which was suspended due to the flood disaster in the city and in Rio Grande do Sul.

In the Brazilian terrain, what is essential to say is that its two national deputies are among the most combative, not only in anti-neoliberal issues and in defense of women and LGBTQIA+ community, but also in the confrontation to the extreme parliamentary and social right.

5. A concrete proposal:

After 14 years since its first approach to FI (2010 World Congress), 10 years as a Permanent Observer and almost six years (since the 2018 World Congress) as a sympathizing organization, the Socialist Left Movement (MES) of Brazil has formally requested its recognition as a full part of the international. Those of us who sign this document express ourselves in favor of this recognition. We also express that we are in favor of the admission, as full members, of Resistencia and APS – as soon as these organizations so desire.

August 2024

Signatures: Alcebíades (Bid) Teixeira and Renato Roseno, (Insurgencia-Reconstrução Democrática, Brazil); Jorgelina Matusevicius (Marabunta, Argentina); José Luis Hernández Ayala, Hector Valdez and José Luis Rojas Días (MSPP, Mexico); Luís Bonilla (Luchas, Venezuela); Manuel Rodríguez (Democracia Socialista, Puerto Rico); Daniel Libreros (Ecosocialistas, Colombia) Andres Lund (PRT, Mexico) Omar Aziki and Jawad Moustakbal (Al Mounadil-a, Morocco); Antoine Larrache (NPA, France) Sébastien Brulez (Gauche anticapitaliste, Belgique) Rafael Bernabé, Ana Cristina Carvalhaes, Joao Machado, Farooq Tariq, Eric Toussaint and Yusop, members of the FI International Committee.

Complement of the undersigned Brazilians:

On FI members, sympathizer or permanent observers in PSOL, the situation is as follows, in summary: Resistência, Subverta and Insurgência-majority are part of the PSOL's leadership bloc (together with the currents of Guilherme Boulos and that of the mayor of Belém). This majority bloc carries out a policy of no differentiation with the Lula government. MES, Rebelião Ecosocialista, Centelhas and APS are part of the Opposition to that majority bloc. Insurgência-Reconstrução Democrática is now debating its position, tending to distance itself from the leadership bloc and trying to call for the formation of a third political camp.

No member or friend of FI in Brazil participates in Lula's government. But PSOL's members participate, yes, directly (like the Minister of Indigenous Peoples, Sonia Guajajara) or on behalf of movements (like the MTST, of Boulos). And there are big differences about the PSOL's policy towards the federal government

and local governments, that is, if these governments deserve our support, to what extent and if they can even be demanded to do something.

The indigenous leader Sonia Guajajara participates in the government but it is an exception voted in a Party Conference. But a leader of Guilherme Boulos' current occupies the Secretariat of Peripheries of the Ministry of Cities, a decision taken totally without consulting PSOL and not at all criticized by the majority bloc. PSOL is also part of the government's parliamentary group (with the Vice-Presidency) in the Lower House. In the municipal government of Belém, an alliance of PSOL, PT and other parties, with the mayor of PSOL, members of MES and APS participate.

Therefore, it seems urgent to us the need for a deep and decisive debate, with the participation of the international community as a whole, on what is the correct policy towards Lula's government in the present international and Brazilian situation.

Ana Cristina, Bid and Renato, Joao Machado

Additional explanation by **Joao Machado, member of Rebellion Ecosocialiste** (member of the Brazilian section) and member of the International Committee of the FI: I sign the text because I agree with its general line: the defence of a Fourth International open to recomposition with various revolutionary traditions and, concretely, the defence of the full integration of the MES. As far as Resistência is concerned, I think that, if a request for full integration is made, it will be necessary to hold an in-depth discussion on the existence (or not) of a sufficient programmatic agreement. I stress that my position is identical to that of Rebelião Ecosocialista, whose conclusion I summarise: a position in favour of the full integration of the MES into the Fourth International and, at the same time, the assessment that it still has important political problems and that its participation in the Brazilian section will bring practical problems, which must be addressed with specific measures.

Resolution by Insurgência and Subverta on the composition of the Brazilian section of the IV International

1. The Brazilian section of the Fourth International is currently made up of five organisations active in the PSOL: Insurgência, Subverta, Ecosocialist Rebellion, Centelhas and Insurgência RD - the latter a minority breakaway from Insurgência that took place in March 2024. The IV International in Brazil also includes Resistência and APS (both permanent observers) and MES (a sympathising organisation). Insurgência, Subverta, Resistência and Insurgência RD make up a party camp - Campo Semente - and are part of the majority bloc in the party's leadership today. The other organisations, although they don't have a common political camp like Semente, are all located in the PSOL's internal opposition. In terms of the number of militants, Insurgência and Subverta

together account for more than half of the section's membership.

2. The fragmentation of the Brazilian groups of the Fourth International, although not exclusive to our country, is fundamentally due to deep differences in characterisation and politics accumulated over the last ten years. These are differences measured against the most decisive political events that have taken place in the country over the last decade - some of a tactical nature, others that reveal a strategic distance from the tradition of revolutionary Marxism expressed by the Fourth International throughout its history, particularly when it comes to the positions defended by the MES. Although there are nuances between the opposition sectors of the PSOL in relation to some of

these differences, the polemics of characterisation and political orientation have been focussed particularly between the organisations of Campo Semente and the MES, which exercises a large majority over the opposition bloc, and which is at the furthest end of the spectrum of relations between the sectors of the Fourth International in Brazil.

3. The differences in orientation begin with the great turning point in the Brazilian conjuncture that occurred after the coup mobilisations of 2014-2015. At that time, the vast majority of the bourgeoisie broke with the PT government and organised mobilisations of hundreds of thousands to overthrow Dilma Rousseff. The political situation in Brazil took a reactionary turn, putting the entire left on

the defensive. Supported by the lawfare of Operation Lava-Jato, a fraudulent judicial offensive in which the US State Department was involved, the Brazilian right succeeded in ousting Dilma Rousseff through a parliamentary coup in 2016, and subsequently went on to implement a labour reform and a series of privatisations and withdrawals of social rights.

4. At that time, Insurgência and what would become Subverta were orientated towards the tactics of the United Front, and began building the Frente Povo Sem Medo (People Without Fear Front) with the homeless movement, also attracting the indigenous movement and sectors that had strayed from the PT camp. This orientation became the majority in the PSOL. The People Without Fear Front became the most dynamic sector of the Brazilian left at that time, leading the main local and national mobilisations of resistance to the parliamentary coup and the offensive of the bourgeoisie. The hierarchy of politics became defined by defensive and unitary tactics, in which PSOL advanced in its construction and political projection on the Brazilian left. It is due to this reorientation that the PSOL has gone over the last ten years from a small vanguard party to the second largest left-wing party in the country, with a strong presence in the social movements and a reference point for political renewal for the popular forces.

5. On the other hand, the MES, unlike the other sectors of the opposition that have relations with the Fourth International in Brazil, openly supported Lava-Jato - a defence it reaffirmed even last year in an article signed by a leader of this organisation during the PSOL congress - and refused to take part in the united front initiatives and the mobilisations against the parliamentary coup. It made concessions to the anti-PT mobilised by the Brazilian right, probably believing that the reactionary rejection of the PT government could be disputed for a left-wing orientation. The PSTU, a party linked to the LIT, which defended a similar orientation, went through a rupture at the same time, and in 2016 MAIS was formed - an organisation that then joined the PSOL and was later renamed Resistência.

6. The different characterisations continued to develop, widening the gap between the organisations that are now

part of the Fourth International in Brazil. Operation Lava-Jato culminated in Lula's political imprisonment in 2018 to prevent him from taking part in the presidential elections that same year. Insurgência, Subverta and the then MAIS built the mobilisations against Lula's imprisonment and for his release. The MES and some other sectors of the PSOL opposition did not - and accused the other organisations of 'capitulating to the PT' by fighting against the coup and Lula's political imprisonment. While the currents that today make up Campo Semente correctly identified the reactionary turn in the relationship of forces in Brazil and on the continent - remember that in those same years there was a coup in Bolivia and an attempted coup in Venezuela - and reoriented their politics towards the tactic of a united front, the others maintained the characterisation that what was underway was a polarisation, and therefore some parity of forces, between the left and the right. Fortunately, the first of these perspectives prevailed in PSOL and the Brazilian left.

7. The reactionary offensive bore fruit and Bolsonaro was elected president in 2018. During the neo-fascist government, the same differences remained. While the sectors of Campo Semente sought to maintain unitary left-wing initiatives against the bourgeois offensive, the MES opted to form a parallel 'front' with Stalinist vanguard organisations, the PCR and the PCB, calling for demonstrations without any effort at unity between the lefts, and accusing the PSOL, once again, of 'capitulation to the PT'. Not even in the face of the existential threat to the left posed by the neo-fascist government was there any reorientation in relation to the United Front, one of the greatest assets of Trotskyist and the Fourth International elaboration.

8. In 2021, when the PSOL began its discussions on the prospects for the following year's elections, there was another significant difference: the MES argued, in a public article signed by one of its main leaders, that the PSOL should support the hypothesis of an electoral front around Ciro Gomes, a right-wing nationalist, as an alternative to a united left slate. Naturally, the proposal did not prosper in the party and was quickly abandoned.

9. In 2022, on the eve of the presidential election, the differences were once

again reaffirmed. While Campo Semente identified that Bolsonarism remained very strong in Brazilian society, and that a united tactic with the PT was therefore necessary in the presidential elections to defeat Bolsonaro's re-election attempt, while at the same time the PSOL presented its own programme and a series of political demands to make this unity possible - the MES argued that Bolsonarism was in decline and that the PSOL should have its own candidacy in the elections to assert its differences with the PT. The first of these views prevailed in the PSOL, which proved to be correct in the face of the narrow lead of Lula's candidacy against Bolsonaro in the first and second rounds.

10. In the face of Lula's election, there was a point of agreement between all the Brazilian organisations that make up the Fourth International: the PSOL should not take part in the new government, since it is a government of class collaboration, with a large participation of right-wing sectors. On this issue, Campo Semente won over the party's majority bloc with a resolution stating that the PSOL would not take part in the government, and that if party members wanted to do so, they should withdraw from their party duties. The MES and other sectors of the opposition voted in favour of this resolution drawn up and negotiated by Campo Semente in the party's internal spaces.

11. At the 8th PSOL Congress, held in 2023, different conceptions of party building were once again revealed. Although it constantly accuses its opponents of 'capitulating to the PT', it was the MES that allied itself with a regional political group that operates simultaneously in the PT and the PSOL, which participates in the state government of the PT in Bahia and disregards the party resolution of non-participation in the government. On this issue, it is worth highlighting the stance of the APS, which, although it is part of the opposition bloc in the party, has refused to form any unity with this sector in Bahia.

12. The differences between the Brazilian groups of the Fourth International, from this point of view, can be summarised in two divergent orientations - keeping in mind the differences between the groups that are part of the PSOL opposition. One orientation, represented by Campo Semente - Insurgência, Subverta,

Resistência and today, Insurgência RD - has understood the shift in the relationship of forces since the reactionary offensive opened in 2014-15 and works with united-front tactics not only to confront the defensive situation, but also to build a political alternative on the left. Another orientation, in general terms represented by the opposition, underestimated and continues to underestimate the strength of the far right in the country and in the world, and could have led the PSOL to repeat mistakes made by political traditions alien and even opposed to that of the Fourth International.

13. There are, however, differences that go beyond the natural and ordinary tactical, characterisation and orientation differences that exist between the different groups. In the case of the MES, these differences take on a strategic dimension as they move closer to third-periodist elaborations - such as the flirtation with equating reformism with neo-fascist forces, or the refusal of the united front. They also gain this dimension by abandoning elementary principles of our strategy, such as class independence from the bourgeoisie. There is also the constant fractional practices with respect to the other organisations of the Fourth International in Brazil: 'agreements' made outside the mechanisms and elected representatives of the organisations, campaigns within the International

against the positions of the currents, etc.

14. The last World Congress of the Fourth International established that new definitions on the composition of the Brazilian section would be the result of a period of experience between the organisations that make it up and the sympathetic and observer organisations. As systematised above, we believe that this experience did not bring the MES closer to the positions and practices of the other sectors. On the contrary, the last period saw the distance between the organisations widen.

15. For this reason, Insurgência and Subverta are opposed to recognising the MES as part of the Brazilian section of the Fourth International. Such recognition would mean giving a seal of approval to the serious political errors committed by this organisation over the last decade in the face of the most serious events in the class struggle during this period. It would also make more flexible the strategic criteria that we consider decisive for an organisation to join the Brazilian section of the Fourth International. We know that there is intense pressure from international bodies to offer this recognition, and it is out of concern that the position of the member organisations of the Brazilian section of the Fourth International will not be respected that we have been forced to pass this resolution. Without the

agreement of the majority of the Brazilian section, the discussion should not be held by force at the next World Congress. Any decision on the Brazilian section must include the participation and respect for the positions of the groups that make it up, within the framework of the democratic tradition that defines our International. We understand that the usual operating procedures of the Fourth International must be respected and reiterated to all the groups that claim to belong to our political tradition.

16. We are in favour of the MES remaining a sympathising organisation of the Fourth International, with the rights that this position confers: although today there is a political gulf between our currents, we believe that the recomposition of socialist and revolutionary forces is a historical process that will involve further relocations and political syntheses. We don't rule out that, in the future, there will be an evolution in this direction. But we hope that this process will have its development defined by experiences, political positions and their due balance. Today, any external interference in this process that seeks artificial rapprochement between the organisations will end up hindering rather than facilitating this path.

Insurgência and Subverta

Our commitment to the Fourth International: 12 years of agreements and construction

The MES was founded 25 years ago with the goal of overcoming the fragmentation of the socialist left, defending an anticapitalist program and class independence. The latest World Congress defined that we would be granted a special status, as a sympathizer section with transitory rights in Brazil. One year later, we began to participate as guests in the leadership bodies and later we solicited to be part of the Brazilian section.

We know that our entry has unleashed polemics and opposition from some organizations. In the midst of the fragmentation that the left is going through, which also includes the Trotskyist movement, a

refusal would be to leave out more than a thousand militants who raise the banner of the IV in Brazil, and would be a blow to the necessary regrouping of revolutionary militants. We want the IV to continue as a pole of attraction in this complex period, in the face of so many ruptures and fragmentations of the left. In this note we want to ratify our internationalist trajectory and the construction of the IV International.

During this quarter of a century, we have never lost our internationalism. We consider this location in the world as central to our political elaboration and action. We broke theoretically with the

narrow vision of building ourselves around a "mother party", as well as with other mistaken concepts rooted in the tradition of Latin American Trotskyism from which we came, as a result of a profound reflection on the fall of the Eastern regimes and the changes in contemporary capitalism.

The arrival of Lula to power in 2003 precipitated an important reconfiguration of the left in Brazil, with the formation of the PSOL, a "broad anti-capitalist party", of which we were founders. We had the advice and support of leaders of the IV: in one of the World Social Forums, we held conversations with Bensaïd, Sábado and Udry on the irreversible course of the PT's

adaptation to the order. The support of these leaders to the formation of the PSOL brought us closer and helped to orient us.

We shared the theoretical and programmatic bases of the IV: the defense of ecosocialism, the commitment to the regroupment of revolutionaries based on politics (and not on balance of the past), the strategic defense of the struggle of the working class and the centrality of the struggle against oppression, the commitment to broad parties, internationalism and the delimitation of both campism and social-liberalism.

Since the 2018 World Congress, we have intensified the building of the IV. We have participated in schools, camps and seminars of the IV. We campaigned intensely for Nicaragua together with former Sandinistas, which culminated in a successful tour by Monica Baltodano to Brazil. We also campaigned against the Russian aggression against Ukraine and organized a tour in Brazil by a leader of Socialist Ruth, an organization that decided to be an observer of the IV. We accepted the idea of the Brazil Commission for periodic meetings of organizations that claim the IV in Brazil and we suggested the Portuguese edition of Inprecor. Our website has translated the texts and resolutions of the IV systematically. We add to the ranks of the IV the various organizations that merged or were incorporated by the MES in Brazil in the last three years.

The building of the PSOL and the politics of the MES in Brazil

The PSOL was in Brazil, a model of a broad party like the one defended by the IV International and as we have said, the MES was one of its builders that allowed it to be transformed over time into the main party to the left of the PT.

From its creation until 2016, the PSOL was a left opposition with an anti-capitalist program, with a reasonably democratic internal regime that allowed the regrouping of organizations from different traditions, as well as intellectuals, trade unionists, human rights defenders, peripheral activists, feminists, blacks, indigenous, LGBTQIA+ independents.

During this period there were internal differences, but they were always bridged within a spirit of internal democracy and respect for its internal caucuses. In the 2014 elections, for example, it was up to

Luciana Genro, -leader of MES-, to be the candidate for president. Luciana was key to bring the vocalization of street sentiment to electoral politics. It was the most united campaign of the PSOL, a fact recognized by its National Executive.

The formation of two blocs in the PSOL and the position of the Fourth International members..

This situation changed as of 2016. Since the election of Lula and the full integration of Boulos and the MTST into the PSOL, there was a reordering of the internal forces of the party. Two blocs were consolidated around how to behave in the face of Lula's new government. On the one hand, the majority, formed by the Boulos caucus, the Primavera Socialista and the Campo Semente, which also includes the organizations of the Fourth: Resistance, Subverta and part of Insurgência, which at its last conference ended up splitting with the formation of Insurgência Reconstrução Democrática (Democratic Reconstruction Insurgency). This bloc is the majority in the PSOL leadership. On the other side, the opposition bloc, formed by the IV International members of the MES, Rebelião Ecosocialista, Centelhas, APS and other forces.

These blocs express divergent positions towards the policies of the Lula government. Boulos' bloc formed by Revolução Solidária, Primavera Socialista and Semente has ended up carrying out a policy of support to the government and ends up appearing as part of the government and in fact it is, since Boulos put the MTST in the Ministry of Cities and in the federal parliamentary group, Boulos is a faithful representative of Lula. Several mayoral candidates presented themselves as "from Lula's team". Even internal caucuses of the PT, such as DS and Articulação de Esquerda, are more critical of the government on many issues than the majority of the PSOL. The party congress of 2023 established (with the support of Semente) a correlation of forces very favorable to the PSOL Popular (Boulos and Primavera), which now control the party apparatus, with regular and electoral funds of millions of dollars per year, at the service of the above mentioned policy. Unfortunately, Boulos' campaign for mayor of São Paulo is a repetition of the most conservative PT campaigns (the axis

of the campaign is "Love for São Paulo").

Together with the caucuses that make up the left bloc, the MES defends a different policy. In a country in a defensive situation, with an active extreme right, it would be a tragedy if the PSOL were to lose its profile as an independent, combative left-wing party, uncompromising with any expression of capital. It is more necessary than ever to have an autonomous political force that expresses, in addition to the permanent anti-fascist banner, a voice for the exploited and oppressed.

We defend that the PSOL is capable of building unity and agreements against the extreme right and the coup, preserving its identity and its program, defending a program of socio-environmental transition and the rights of the working people. The global "multi-crisis" demands elaboration and creative revolutionary responses. All class unities against the reversals imposed by capital are valid, but preserving an ecosocialist anti-capitalist alternative is a fundamental task - in the face of the traditional left's capitulation and the fragmentation of the revolutionary left. To transform the important tactic of the possible and defensive united front into a permanent strategy, leaving aside the banners and possibilities of a transitional program, is to abandon the revolutionary camp definitively.

We are far from having a sectarian position. We understand that the main enemy we face is the neo-fascist right wing that is growing in Brazil and the world. That is how in Rio Grande do Sul, after the climatic tragedy of May-June, we have been united, as was necessary, in an alliance with the PT, which does not have any party of the bourgeoisie. Proof of our active participation together with the IV International is also the fact that together with the PT of Porto Alegre we gave the initial impulse for the convocation of the Antifascist Conference postponed by the climatic catastrophe that took place in the State.

Joining forces to confront the far right and build an ecosocialist future.

The IV Congress will take place in a context of aggravation of the global crisis, with elements of aggravation of the war disputes and the advances of the far right, as well as the enormous aggravation of the climate crisis. The fight against the far

right and the environmental catastrophe require more and more initiatives from us. Serious problems such as Israel's colonial and murderous offensive in Palestine, Trump in the US elections, the climate tragedies, solidarity with the Ukrainian people, the growth of the far right in Europe, the attacks on immigrants, to name but a few, demand elaboration and creative revolutionary responses.

In Latin America, the governments of Ortega and Maduro are authoritarian expressions that hold back the consciousness of millions, because they identify themselves as "left wing", facilitating the work of the most reactionary ultra-right on the layers of the mass movement. For us it is a central task to elaborate a strategy of political-ideological struggle to combat campism.

All class and oppressed units against

the setbacks imposed by capital are on the radar, but to build or preserve an ecosocialist anti-capitalist alternative is a task as fundamental as the first, in the face of the claudication of sectors of the traditional left and the fragmentation of the revolutionary left. To transform the important tactic of the possible and defensive united front into a permanent strategy, conceding the historic role, principles and possibilities of a transitional program, is to abandon the revolutionary camp definitively. We will not do that.

The IV can develop, retaking a greater coordination in its Latin American construction, a strong ecosocialist movement in the region and in the Americas, with a focus on the Amazon issues, being a reference in the International Antifascist Meeting of Porto Alegre and in the COP30 of Belém. With these more immediate

objectives and equipped with the ecosocialist program of transition, the MES fights in Brazil to strengthen the struggle for another future, for a social revolution and for internationalism, at the service of the emergency brake that humanity needs. On this path and in the urgency of our times of multiple crises, it makes no sense to veto unity among revolutionaries. The current disagreements among those who claim to be part of the Fourth in Brazil cannot be an obstacle for all to work together to strengthen the IV International.

With Fourthist greetings,

September 2024

Israel Dutra and Pedro Fuentes,
of the MES-Brasil leadership

On the MES demand for full integration into the Fourth International

I) The MES's relationship with the Fourth International

Since 2012 (when the International Committee approved a protocol that opened a process of discussion with a view to integrating the MES into the Fourth International - QI, and the MES became a permanent observer), and especially since 2018, when the status of sympathetic organisation was approved, the MES's relationship with the International has evolved positively. It has participated as a guest in IC and Bureau meetings. It takes part in the discussions and deliberations of the international bodies, and has done so in a very integrated way, without any significant differentiation from the other participants. In general, its press publishes FI statements or resolutions.

As is well known, the MES has its origins in the Morenist current (referenced on the Argentinian leader Nahuel Moreno), which split from the Fourth International in 1979. On the other hand, since its proximity to the FI began to strengthen, the MES also have reference to contributions from other international leaders, such as

Ernest Mandel, Daniel Bensaïd or Michael Lowy, and has assimilated issues that were not part of the Moreno tradition, such as feminism or ecosocialism.

It's important to note that Morenist origins are not a problem for an organisation's full integration into the International. The FI has never defined itself as a 'Mandelist' organisation, for example. For many years it has sought to integrate, quite successfully, both Trotskyist militants and militants who come from other political traditions. The conception of the International that we have defended is of a plural International – within the framework of revolutionary socialist militancy and agreement with its programme.

The MES carries out important internationalist activity, benefiting from the fact that it has the resources and parliamentarians to travel and organise activities. In general, these activities are consistent with the political line of the Fourth International and are useful for the internationalist struggle. It is worth noting that they are not always coordinated with the leadership of the International or with the sections in the various countries. In part,

this can be explained by difficulties that do not depend on the MES and the fact that it has not yet been fully integrated into the International. In any case, if this integration is approved by the Congress, it will be important to include some guidance in the resolution so that there is greater coordination of international activities.

II) The trajectory of the MES in Brazil

It's important to highlight a very important right choice of the MES (and other organisations), which was the decision to build the PSOL after the PT was mischaracterised as a socialist party with class independence.

From the beginning of its construction, PSOL had significant divisions between more left-wing sectors and less left-wing (or more right-wing) sectors. There were already sectors that defended and practised conceptions of party membership that were too 'broad' (without treating a clear identification with socialism as a decisive criterion), while other sectors argued that PSOL should be a plural party

in the left field, but with a more delimited political identity. From the PSOL's early years, there were also important disagreements over electoral alliances – for example, the defence by some sectors, in some cases, of alliances with bourgeois parties. In these early years of the PSOL, the MES was among the sectors that defended 'broader' conceptions of affiliations and alliances, with less concern for class political independence. It made a sometimes little critical assessment of the PDT (a bourgeois party), seen as 'less bad' than the PT, and adopted an excessive electoralism, sometimes with the defence of electoral alliances that were too broad (for example, with the PV – Green Party; the Brazilian PV has never been a party identified with the struggles of the exploited and oppressed, as well as being, in reality, very 'un-green').

Another problem with the MES was the conception of over-prioritise the fight against corruption. Between 2008 and 2009, the delegate (at the time) Protógenes Queiroz, who led anti-corruption enquiries, was treated as a hero. Fighting corruption is important, but it hardly helps to raise the level of class consciousness and identification with socialism among the population, since this approach leads people to see society's problems (and those of a government) as stemming from the existence of 'corrupt individuals', and not from the interests of social classes in struggle, etc. Even more complicated than putting the fight against corruption at the forefront is doing so by singling out a 'hero' – in this case, a police officer. This conception certainly contributed to the MES's much more serious later mistake, its support for Operação Lava Jato (Operation Car Wash).

There were problems with campaign financing. The PSOL has never been particularly strict on this issue, and while corporate funding was allowed under Brazilian law (until 2016), it was not banned by the party, although it was not common. Only funding by multinational companies was prohibited, and funding by large companies was very much frowned upon. However, election campaigns in Rio Grande do Sul (a state in which MES runs PSOL) were a negative highlight on this point. In 2008, the PSOL in Porto Alegre (the state capital) accepted funding from the metallurgical company Gerdau (a large Brazilian company, which also operates abroad) and the main Brazilian

arms manufacturer (Taurus). In 2012, the highlight was financing from the state's largest supermarket chain. In addition, in its early years, a movement of popular courses promoted by the MES (the *Emanicipa Network*) was funded through 'partnerships' with companies.

To make it possible to analyse the positions of the MES after these early years of the PSOL, it is necessary to summarise the political divisions in the party since then.

PSOL's political divisions since 2012

Since 2012, the PSOL has been divided into two blocs. The more right-wing (or less left-wing) bloc was called 'Unidade Socialista' ('Socialist Unity' – US) until 2019, and 'PSOL de Todas as Lutas' ('PSOL of All Struggles' – PTL) afterwards. The more left-wing sectors formed the 'Left Bloc' or, more recently, the 'Left Opposition'. There have been some changes in the composition of the blocs over the years. The MES was always part of the 'Left Bloc' and then the of the 'Left Opposition'.

PSOL's internal differences became more acute. The US went much further in its defence of 'broad' alliances than any sector of the PSOL had done in the early years. Antagonistic party projects began to exist within the PSOL. The US project was a fundamentally electoral party, with occasional alliances with large right-wing parties, and more regular alliances with the small right-wing parties that are called 'rent parties' in Brazil. The sectors that made up the Left Bloc, although they never had the unity to define a coherent party project, broadly maintained the original project of building PSOL.

From 2016 onwards, with the approval of Dilma Rousseff's impeachment and the PT's move to oppose the federal government, the US moved closer to the PT – a party that had, by this point, passed through the government and practised an explicit policy of class conciliation.

While the Brazilian section of FI was unified (until 2016), it participated in the 'Left Bloc', without any internal controversy about it. At the last party congress before the section split, held at the end of 2015, the MES had already made the serious mistake of supporting Operation Car Wash (the main argument used today to justify its choice by organisations that take part in the Brazilian section and that are in the PSOL's more right-wing bloc). The MES had begun to correct its position, but only to a limited extent; the Brazilian

section's position was already much more critical of Car Wash. In any case, no-one in the section had any doubt that the differences it had with the US were then much greater than its differences with the MES. It was after the section split, from 2016 onwards, that there began to be divergences in the evaluation of the US.

After 2019, with the entry into PSOL of Guilherme Boulos and his current (the MTST - *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Teto*, which is a mix of popular housing movement and political current), the US was transformed, with changes in its composition, including the incorporation of part of the Brazilian section (*Insurgência and Subverta*), into 'PSOL de Todas as Lutas' (PTL).

The transformation of the US into the PTL greatly reinforced the tendency of the PSOL's most right-wing bloc to move closer to the PT. In the debate about whether the party would launch its own candidacy for the presidency of the Republic in the first round of the 2022 elections, which took place during 2021 and the first part of 2022, the big question was whether PSOL needed to have a political profile different from the PT (the position of the more left-wing sectors of PSOL), or whether this wasn't necessary, since in any case PSOL should support Lula's candidacy from the first round (the majority position in PTL).

The PTL is subdivided into two sub-blocks. The hegemonic sector (the 'Popular PSOL' - PP, formed by Guilherme Boulos' current⁽¹⁾ and the 'Primavera Socialista' – 'Socialist Spring') defends its formal participation in the Lula government and does so in a non-transparent but very effective way (it participates mainly in the "Secretariat for the Peripheries" of the Ministry of Cities); it feels very comfortable in the "very broad front" that constitutes the Lula government, with numerous right-wing parties and broad sectors of the Brazilian bourgeoisie.

PTL's minority sub-bloc of the PTL, the 'Campo Semente' ('Seed Camp'), is basically made up of organisations that are part of the Brazilian section of QI and Resistência. It defends class political independence, is uncomfortable with PSOL's participation in the 'very broad front' and would like the government's policy to be more to the left. It also claims to be opposed to the PSOL's participation in the Lula government. However, contradicto-

1) Currently called the 'Solidarity Revolution', its backbone is made up of MTST militants affiliated to the PSOL, but it includes other militants.

rily, he supports the PP. This has given the PP, since the PSOL Congress of 2023, total bureaucratic and financial control of the party leadership, as it occupies both the presidency and the treasury(1).

There have been internal tensions within Campo Semente, largely due to the contradiction between positions that are theoretically more to the left and support for the PP. The split of Insurgência in 2024 (after internal debates that lasted a few years, and some previous militant splits) was the most visible consequence of these tensions, but it wasn't the only one: there have been important internal debates and militant splits in the other organisations that make up this camp, and it can be assessed that its continuity after the 2024 elections is uncertain.

The PP treats the PSOL as a kind of 'external wing of the PT', with an autonomy in relation to it that is not very different from that of the internal currents of this party that consider themselves to be on the 'left of the PT'. In fact, some leaders of the 'left wing of the PT', in private conversations, complain that the PSOL is too aligned with the majority positions of the PT and the Lula government, and thus hinders the battle they are waging to tilt the PT and the government further to the left.

Resumption of the evaluation of the MES

Since 2011-2012, the MES has made a left turn in line with Brazilian politics; it's participation in the left opposition to the majority of the PSOL leadership should be valued very positively. However, even in this period the MES has made important political mistakes.

The worst was the support for Lava Jato (Operation Car Wash), motivated by the prominence given to the fight against corruption. On the other hand, it's important to say that, at first, PSOL's support for Lava Jato went well beyond the MES, which is largely explained by the fact that the political motivations of this operation only became evident after some time. Before the vote on Dilma Rousseff's impeachment, the MES began to calibrate and partially correct its position and to adopt a more critical stance towards Lava Jato.

At the beginning of 2021, when Lula was still without his political rights and

couldn't be a candidate, the MES even started discussing the possibility of PSOL supporting the candidacy of Ciro Gomes (a clearly bourgeois politician) for the presidency of the Republic. Before this discussion could reach any conclusion, Lula regained his political rights, and the 'Ciro Gomes' hypothesis was abandoned.

Another problem was, in 2022, the MES' defence of the "federation"(2) of PSOL with Rede Sustentabilidade, a non-socialist party, more identified with "green capitalism". In many municipalities, members of the Rede are no different from members of traditional right-wing parties; in fact, both the transit from the Rede to a clearly right-wing party and the transit in the opposite direction are frequent.

For many years, the MES was not part of an international organisation, and this has consequences. Making very drastic turns, trying to 'ride the wave' of some phenomenon, is typical of an organisation forced to think only about the situation in one country. Being part of an international organisation, where the political debate is more in-depth, will be beneficial for the current.

The MES's political mistakes shouldn't make us forget that, for the most part, it has defended correct positions in a combative way. In general, it relies on the struggle and mobilisation of social movements. He has a good youth presence. The two federal deputies that the MES has today are among the best and most combative parliamentarians in the country (and it also has other great parliamentarians).

III) The situation in the Brazilian section, conclusion and proposal

The Brazilian section of the Fourth International is currently divided into five organisations: Insurgência (majority), Insurgência - Reconstrução Democrática, Rebelião Ecosocialista, Centelhas and Subverta. (In addition to these five organisations, MES currently has the status of sympathetic organisation, and APS and Resistência that of permanent observers). The MES currently has more militants than the section's five organisations combined. Obviously, this isn't a problem of the

MES, but of the great fragmentation and weakening suffered by the section.

The MES has managed to bring together and integrate collectives, militants and political organisations in various regions of the country. But we believe that its conception of left-wing unity is limited (unity by incorporating other organisations into its structure) and that true unity is built on a process of open dialogue, where differences are recognised and worked on, and not simply integrated in a subordinate way into a hegemonic organisation. The MES's self-proclaimed stance towards other organisations could be a symptom of internal functioning problems.

Taking all these issues into account, we can draw a twofold conclusion.

1. FI in general, and the Brazilian section in particular, have a lot to gain from the full integration of MES. Therefore, we, Rebelião Ecosocialista, are in favour of it.

2. The MES still has major political problems, and this should lead us to the conclusion that, as it is today, it would not be in a good position to become the backbone of the reconstruction of a unified Brazilian section; such a construction under the hegemony of the MES would facilitate the permanence of the political problems pointed out. Furthermore, given the current disparity in the size of the organisations, and given the conception of unity put into practice by the MES, there is a risk that it will dominate the section as soon as it becomes part of it.

The entry of the MES will therefore have to be accompanied by measures to give the other organisations the chance to continue to exist. None of the organisations that will be part of the section should be able to present themselves as 'the Brazilian section of FI'; international initiatives should be discussed with the International bodies and with the whole section; all organisations should be represented on the international leadership bodies. It would be particularly important to hold regular meetings between the various organisations. This would help to overcome various political problems (including those of the MES) and would make it possible to discuss any programmatic differences. We suggest that, after the World Congress, the International encourage and monitor these discussions.

Rebelião Ecosocialista

1) One of the consequences of this control is that the distribution of public funds that the party receives for electoral campaigns has become much less democratic than before.

2) The federation between parties is a mechanism that was adopted by Brazilian electoral legislation to cater for parties that, on their own, would not be able to fulfil the 'barrier clause'.

On the relationship between Resistência and the IV International

Resistência's decision to ask permanent observer status with the Fourth International is a development of the relationship that this organisation has maintained with the International since its foundation in 2018, which is reinforced by the fact that it forms a political camp («PSOL Semente») with two organisations that are part of the Brazilian section of the International, Insurgência and Subverta.

Rebelião Ecosocialista supports the approval of this statute, which signifies the recognition that Resistência is an organisation with which the International has an interest in maintaining regular exchanges. Resistência is not yet recognised as part of the Fourth International, but could become so if things progress well.

However, in the judgement of Ecosocialist Rebellion, the meeting of the International Committee should not simply approve this request. We consider it essential to express our concern about the evolution of the political positions of Resistência (and of «PSOL Semente») in recent years, and to suggest measures that, in our opinion, should be taken by the IC.

To explain our concern, the first step is to remember that «PSOL Semente» is part of the majority bloc in the PSOL leadership, the «PSOL de Todas as Lutas» (PSOL of All Struggles), alongside the «PSOL Popular» camp. Since the last PSOL congress, the latter alone has the absolute majority of the PSOL, and no longer depends on «PSOL Semente» to form a majority.

Not only does «PSOL Popular» have a position in favour of PSOL's full participation in Lula's government – which, as we know, is a government of class conciliation – but it doesn't actually advocate any independence from the PT or any fundamental difference with its political orientation. It explicitly positions itself against any attempt to build an alternative to the Lula government's orientation (in the thesis it presented to the PSOL Congress in 2023, «PSOL Popular» stated that «the space for building alternatives [to Lula's govern-

ment] in this period is temporarily interdicted»). It is already preparing to support Lula's re-election in 2026, regardless of the programme of this candidacy.

PSOL Popular» participates in Lula's government. It has dozens of activists in «cargos de confiança» (positions of trust) in the government, it runs the Secretariat for Peripheries in the Ministry of Cities, and it has minister Sonia Guajajara in the Ministry of Indigenous Peoples. (The latter participation was considered by the PSOL National Directorate to represent movements of indigenous peoples, and formally did not come from a party proposition. It is worth noting, however, that the movement in which Sonia Guajajara participates – APIB, Articulação dos Povos Indígenas do Brasil – has expressed a more critical position than PSOL on what the Lula government has allowed the Ministry of Indigenous Peoples to do).

In the municipality of Belém (capital of the state of Pará), which it runs, the «PSOL Popular» is putting into practice the same broad front (i.e. a coalition with bourgeois parties) that is in charge of the federal government. In this year's municipal elections, the PSOL is running for mayor of São Paulo in alliance with the PT, and candidate Guilherme Boulos (the main public figure of the «PSOL Popular») has said that he wants to form a broad front like Lula's. Guilherme Boulos' line in this candidacy, unfortunately, is characterised by the most crass electoralism. For example: recently, when Lula spoke out emphatically condemning the genocide taking place in the Gaza Strip, Boulos was asked by journalists what he thought of what Lula had said. He refused to make any comment (obviously fearing negative electoral repercussions), claiming that «he is not a candidate for mayor of Tel Aviv».

Since the 2023 Congress, there has been a significant reduction in the PSOL's internal democracy.

Unfortunately, Resistência not only supports the majority bloc in the PSOL leadership (in this it is accompanied by

«PSOL Semente», with the exception of part of Insurgência, which differentiated itself during the PSOL Congress), but it has also completely tied its future to Guilherme Boulos. In November 2023, one of its main leaders, comrade Valério Arcary, published a text on the organisation's line entitled «The Boulos strategy». This «strategy» can be summarised as making Boulos the political successor to Lula as the leader of the Brazilian left. Giving this line the name «strategy» says a lot about Resistência's political perspectives.

Since the PSOL is a party that, in fact, participates in a class-collaboration government, which does not publicly express a general orientation that differs from that of the PT, revolutionary Marxist militants can no longer feel at ease in the party, as they did in the past. If, on the one hand, until now, even the organisations that are part of the Brazilian section of the IV and are opposed to the current PSOL leadership judges that the right thing to do is to continue to be part of the PSOL, and expressing as possible disagreements with several of the majority positions in the party, on the other hand, this assessment could change in the future. It is possible to say that whether or not to continue in the PSOL is, for the time being, a tactical choice of party building.

However, what cannot be considered a tactical issue in the assessment of Rebelião Ecosocialista is the decision to support the majority bloc in the PSOL leadership, because it has become, in a very explicit way, a bloc that supports a class-collaborationist government, that defends and practices participation in this government, and that already makes it clear that it will maintain this line in the coming years. Supporting this bloc implies a strategic divergence from any revolutionary Marxist position.

The fact that Resistência does not itself participate in the government, and does not itself participate in the municipal administration of Belém (in this respect with a

more correct position than MES and APS) does not solve the problem. Our judgement is that Resistência is moving away from a revolutionary Marxist orientation.

For this reason, Ecosocialista Rebelião is in favour of approving the status of permanent observer of the Fourth International for Resistência, but, maintaining its current positions, would not be in favour of its acceptance as part of the Brazilian section of the Fourth International, if this claim were to be made.

We are not asking the International Committee to agree with our judgements. We believe, however, that it is necessary for the IC to hold a debate about them and reach a conclusion in the future.

Finally, we propose that the IC guide the Brazilian organisations linked to the Fourth International to establish regular discussions between them, with the Bureau following up. We believe that the existence of such discussions can contribute to overcoming the enormous political differences that currently exist in the Brazilian section.

Update note (10/10/2014)

This note briefly lists and comments on events after February 2024. In general, we believe that they give more reason to our critical assessment of Resistência.

1. In March 2024 Insurgência split into two organisations; the majority sector kept its name, and the minority sector was renamed 'Insurgência - Democratic Reconstruction'. The relationship between Insurgência and Resistência was one of the central issues of disagreement. After the split, Insurgência (majority) decided to go ahead with its unification with Resistência.

2. In the first round of the 2024 municipal elections in Brazil, held on 06/10/2024, Guilherme Boulos made it through to the second round of the São Paulo mayoral election, which will be held on 27/10; he came second, with a very small difference in votes to the current mayor, who is running for re-election. In general, the assessment we made in February, that Boulos' campaign line was characterised by shallow electoralism, was confirmed; he abandoned various PSOL positions or positions he himself had previously held, certainly to avoid controversy that could lose him votes. In addition, the strongest brand the campaign adopted was that Boulos was 'Lula's candidate'. However,

this line made it more difficult to run a campaign that mobilised militants; these assessments were not only made by the more left-wing sectors of PSOL.

The electoral polls indicate that the current mayor is starting out as the favourite in the second round. A Boulos victory may be possible, and it will be very important to fight for it, but it may depend on some change in the campaign line that favours greater mobilisation of left-wing militancy.

3. In the city of Belém (in the state of Pará), the PSOL's electoral result was very bad. The current mayor, a member of the majority bloc in the PSOL leadership, didn't make it to the second round and got less than 10 per cent of the vote. The number of councillors elected by the party was also reduced.

We'll have to wait for the results of the second round to make a general assessment of the PSOL's results in the country as a whole.

4. Regarding the positions defended by Resistência, there was one important novelty. One of Resistência's leaders, comrade Henrique Canary, published a series of articles over the course of the year on Resistência's website and in the Jacobin - Latin America magazine that set out a debate that we can only consider programmatic, and that doesn't concern just Brazil. The texts were written in a personal capacity and not as a position of the organisation. However, it is possible to assess that they reflect the position towards which the majority of Resistência tends, both because many of the ideas expressed in them appear in texts by other leaders (such as comrade Valério Arcary) and because they are consistent with the practical positions that Resistência is adopting. In fact, these texts make it easier to understand the political line of Resistência.

To summarise, these texts argue that we are living in a historical era marked by a profound subjective crisis of the working class, in which the idea of a socialist revolution is no longer on the 'political horizon' but only on the 'historical horizon'. The factor that most contributed to this crisis of working-class subjectivity was the historic defeat of the working-class and of the socialist project that the capitalist restoration in the Soviet Union meant. At the present time, 'when processes of struggle break out, the forces of historical progress

represented by socialism are incapable of contesting the direction of events and are pushed aside with the greatest of ease by the ultra-right'; 'in every process of struggle, the extreme right manages to push the forces of the left away from the centre of the political stage'. (H. Canary, 'La crisis subjetiva de la clase trabajadora', 'The subjective crisis of the working class'). This subjective crisis of the working class is combined with the various crises at world level (economic, political, social, environmental, wars) and this makes it possible for the far right to take the offensive.

Comrade Henrique says in the same article that under these conditions, it is not possible to put into practice the tactic of the united front as formulated by the Communist International and as Trotsky, for example, defended in the 1920s and 1930s. In this classic formulation, it was combined with the defence of demands that would later be called 'transitional demands' and aimed to create conditions for the working class to fight for power. Now, as the comrade made more explicit in another article, 'in the face of the offensive of fascism, our programme is fundamentally defensive, "minimal", democratic', and the tactic of the united front necessarily takes on a defensive character (H. Canary, 'It is impossible to fight fascism by persisting in the mistakes of the past'). The comrade also says that 'it is possible that the period we are living through will be consolidated as a long transition to a new phase of capitalism. How long? Impossible to say. Perhaps long enough for us to have to talk about generations, not years' (H. Canary, "The drama of revolutionaries in a time without revolution").

In this era in which we must live, we would fight against the extreme right and for a minimum programme, seeking to mobilise the masses for these objectives and thus connect with them. This could lead to overcoming the subjective crisis of the working class. Comrade Henrique recognises that 'this approach' would be reformist 'in form'. But 'deep down, it is the most revolutionary action of our time: reconnecting with the masses' (H. Canary, 'La crisis subjetiva de la clase trabajadora').

Without wishing to criticise comrade Henrique's argument here, it is the case of doing two observations.

1. The characterisation that we are at

a time when it is only possible to fight for a minimum programme implies the adoption of an 'stagist' conception.

2. This approach clashes with the Marxist-revolutionary tradition, which is 'anti-stagist', especially with the theory of permanent revolution and the method of transitional demands and the tactic of the united front in its classic version. In fact, comrade Henrique himself acknowledges the last two points in the text quoted ('it must be recognised that this orientation is in contradiction with the orientations of the classics of Marxism who elaborated the anti-fascist struggle, above all Leon Trótski in the 1930s'; he doesn't mention

the theory of permanent revolution), and justifies his position by arguing that today's working class is not the same as it was in the 20th century.

It would be difficult to find a proposal for revolutionary militants that is further from what is expressed in the 'Manifesto of Revolutionary Marxism in the Age of Capitalist Ecological and Social Destruction'. Unfortunately, even if the current situation were exactly as described by comrade Henrique, and if everything were to turn out as he predicts, there would be the inevitable problem that, in a phase of capitalism that we would reach after years or generations, humanity would be confronted

with the terrible consequences of a huge worsening of the ecological catastrophe underway. If our aim is to help humanity achieve the best living conditions that are still possible on our battered planet, we don't have 'generations' of time to get out of capitalism. Unfortunately, this point is not addressed by the comrade.

There is no doubt that we are facing a fundamental programmatic discussion that concerns the entire International.

24/02/2024

Rebelião Ecosocialista

To the Bureau of the Fourth International

Comrades,

As the International knows, the Brazilian section has undergone a new split, with the separation of the Insurgency into two organisations.

This split, as well as representing another setback for the unity of Brazilian revolutionary Marxists, was the result of the unilateral interruption of the Insurgency's conference process less than 24 hours before it opened, when the formal majority of the national leadership informed the delegates that it thought differed from its positions, communicating the exclusion of around a third of the democratically elected delegates at the base of the current. With this attitude, dozens of comrades from different and respected backgrounds, including leaders of popular and trade union movements, the black movement, ecosocialist environmentalists and the student movement, as well as a parliamentarian, were prevented from having their positions presented at the highest level of the current and, thus, from the organisation as a whole seeking a possible synthesis on issues that we are experiencing at the moment, such as the debate on the PSOL's role in the Brazilian left and its internal democracy.

Let's repeat: the recent split of Insurgência, and the subsequent reor-

ganisation of these militants into a new organisation, for the time being called Insurgência - Reconstrução Democrática (Insurgency - Democratic Reconstruction), was not the result of a decision agreed by the divergent parties, but of the illegitimate and authoritarian exclusion carried out by a fraction of its leadership, with the aim of preventing positions divergent to their own from being debated by the entire elected delegation to the national conference. This exclusion was camouflaged by an artificial vote, without the presence of a large part of the delegations that had been elected at the local conferences. Clearly, this division represents a defeat for the entire Brazilian section. Once again, partial interests have prevailed, which, although legitimate, could have been pursued in other ways that would have preserved the unity of the quartist militancy in the country. This is a situation that we deeply regret, but it could not immobilise us, which is why our reconstruction is currently underway in seven Brazilian states, affirming our democratic tradition and willingness to fight.

Paradoxically, while what used to be the unified Brazilian section continues to fragment, several other organisations with different traditions and references have approached the Fourth International and demanded its integration. Unlike

other sectors, we don't see this opening up of the IV International's influence as a kind of competition between organisations, to be managed according to criteria of seniority or tactical and conjunctural conveniences.

Our understanding of internationalism presupposes an understanding of the primacy of global processes over local ones. It is the objective tendency of capital to constitute itself as an internationalised process of concentration and centralisation that creates the objective basis for the struggles of the subaltern classes to also meet within international frameworks, building common struggles and experiences. This is why Marx says that proletarians have no homeland, since their struggles, like capital's, cannot be limited to national borders.

What guides us in joining and building a revolutionary Marxist international organisation is not the greater or lesser acceptance of the national orientations of a given political current, but the common understanding of the historical stage of capitalism and the tasks it entails for the construction of a new ecosocialist society. Even more so in a country with dependent and peripheral capitalism, different regional realities and a historical moment permeated by general and conjunctural transformations, it is understandable that there

are different readings. Nevertheless, a shared understanding of the more general tasks could be transformed into more convergent processes of struggle locally, based on the discussions that participation in the International itself makes possible. Our challenge is greater than our differences.

The IV International's consolidated understanding of the unity between the crisis of capitalist civilisation and the imminence of environmental collapse calls us to bring revolutionary Marxists closer together, even in different and transitory organisational frameworks. It is because we have this understanding that we oppose any veto on joining currents because of past positions, doctrinal tradition or disputes

over influence in the movements. Our frameworks are internationalist, and it is on this basis that we believe it is necessary and urgent to set up processes that allow some degree of organised debate and agreements for common actions between all the organisations in Brazil and beyond that place themselves within the framework of the Fourth International and intend to join it. We believe that only in this way will we be contributing to curbing the dispersion and building the political unity of the quartists in Brazil, and enabling the Fourth International to rise to the challenges of the current situation by bringing together political organisations from plural traditions in its composition.

Proposals for strengthening the Fourth International in Brazil:

- Publication of Inprecor in Portuguese.
- Holding regular meetings between the leaderships of the various organisations to debate national and international issues, with the creation of a 'Fourth Internationalist Forum'.

- Promoting broader events, such as debates on the urgent issues of the national and international class struggle (inter-imperialist conflicts, such as the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, the new configurations of contemporary capitalism, characterisation of the Brazilian situation, etc), training courses, among other joint actions.

Insurgência - Reconstrução Democrática

In view of the debate in the Fourth International on the request for entry as a section of MES

1. In our international organisation (the Fourth International) a debate has been opened on the entry of the MES. There has been an exchange of positions, initiated by a letter signed by several militants of the international, proposing and endorsing the entry of this organisation. This has provoked several responses: the majority of the section in Brazil, made up of Insurgencia and Subverta, has pronounced itself against this incorporation. The MES responded to this pronouncement and subsequently, Rebelião Ecosocialista sent a letter with its position in which, despite presenting profound negative arguments about the characterisation of the MES, it positioned itself in favour of its entry. Another of the section's organisations, Centelhas, has yet to make its position known.

2. This debate is taking place just a few months before the world congress. The Bureau and the Brazil commission that was formed at the time to mediate in the orientation debates between the Brazilian organisations are discussing the issue. It is

obvious that the time of the debate is accelerating, but we believe that it is important, in parallel to the political debate which will take its time, to clarify a fundamental question.

3. The undersigned organisations of the Fourth International consider it fundamental that there be a prior agreement, clearly democratic, to resolve the question of the entry of MES into the Fourth International. In our opinion, it is fundamental that there be the approval of the majority of the Brazilian section and the agreement of the world congress. Both conditions are unavoidable. But the tradition and political culture of our current demands respect for the majority will of a section and makes it unimaginable to bypass it at a world congress. Only in exceptional cases, in which a section would place itself outside the political framework of the FI because of an opportunist or sectarian drift or the existence within it of corrupt practices or practices contrary to the very values of our current, would it be possible to consider bypassing the majority will of the section

at a congress on such a fundamental issue. This is obviously not the case for the Brazilian section.

4. If this methodology is not respected, a very serious precedent would be set, in which an international faction with a majority at the moment imposes a certain composition on the national sections, with irreversible consequences for the democratic culture of which the IV is proud. In this sense, the signatories of this letter urge the Bureau and all the structures of the IV International to respect these criteria for the accession process, prior to the necessary deepening of the fraternal political discussion.

11/10/2024

Leadership of Socialistisk Politik (Swedish section of the FI), Confederal Leadership Permanent Commission of Anticapitalistas (Section of the FI in the Spanish State)

IV and Brazil: opening up to the future or the legacy of the sect?

The crisis of capitalist civilisation is taking on dramatic contours: the great acceleration has gone beyond planetary borders and in the next few years several «tipping points» of the Earth System are set to rupture. Wars, social crisis and fascism accompany the climatic collapse. Time is not in our favour. We no longer have the option of moving in step with capitalist progress. In a decade or two, environmental catastrophes will make it much, much more difficult to organise the working class within the framework of politics as we know it. What dynamics of world revolution will be able to operate in a militarised world, with a generalised ecological crisis and migrations of hundreds of millions of people?

We need a firm and inclusive orientation for the years ahead of us. We don't know what forms the revolution will take in the world we are entering, but we do know that when neo-fascism emerges: there are no peaceful transitions to ecosocialism; there will be no national popular power unless it destroys the bourgeois apparatus and sustains itself internationally; nature and society are intertwined in a qualitatively different way than at any other time. We need an ambitious international revolutionary organisation that is open to the existing emancipatory radicalities.

IV was the only internationalist Marxist organisation that, because of its openness, made it through the decades of neoliberal globalisation. Will we be able to make the leap we need to make in the face of the crisis? Will we be able to group parties, movements and militant nuclei not around traditions, but around strategic political-programmatic definitions? How will we respond, with all due differences, to the ambitions that led to the foundation of our current on the eve of the last great war?

I want to share an experience that seems relevant to the situation we are experiencing. At the beginning of the 1980s, when we were building the PT and Socialist Democracy (DS) and discussing why we should integrate into the IV, two

texts imposed themselves as the references of our debate, texts that we incorporated into our political culture. One of them is «Party or sect-fraction», by John Ross, then at the English IMG; the other is «The need for a revolutionary international organisation», by Ernest Mandel and John Ross. They were the highlights of the first issues of the journal *Perspectiva Internacional*. This is now a forgotten page in our history, although it was later disseminated as a concept of political organisation by the work of Daniel Bensaid. But these texts were important tools for nucleating in the DS the militancy that emerged from the struggles of the 1980s in Brazil. And they allowed us to present the IV to the entire PT in a haughty manner, as well as the PT, then a broad socialist party, to the IV and the world left.

These references were widespread on the Brazilian left in the 2000s, when we launched the World Social Forum as an open space for all alterglobalisation. They were decisive when, with the social-liberal drift of the PT, part of the DS militancy joined in the formation of PSOL as an open socialist party. The DS organisations wanted to build a party, not a sect, and they have always worked with many other groups. This is why so many claim to be from the IV in Brazil. It's the result of four decades of spreading an anti-sectarian, anti-Stalinist and internationalist political culture in a continental country, something we can be proud of.

Twenty years on, under a third Lula government (the result of an anti-fascist alliance with important capitalist sectors), the PSOL and the Brazilian quartistas have to define their direction in a world that is losing its way. The party gained visibility under the leadership of Heloisa Helena and stabilised with the electoral campaigns of 2010 (Plinio Sampaio) and 2014 (Luciana Genro). The entry into PSOL of half of the former PSTU (the Resistance) in 2016 and Boulos' MTST in 2019 made the party even broader. In 2018, with the assassination of Marielle Franco, the party reaffirmed the anti-fascist, feminist and anti-racist path that had already marked it, but with new political cleavages that

Brazilian organisations consider strategic.

The most important difference in the PSOL is how we relate to the Lula government, in a position of independence or active collaboration (those in favour of the opposition stance left the party in the 2022 electoral process). This guides whether or not many social struggles are taken forward, how the fight against fascism takes place, the intervention of the parliamentary bench, etc. Above all, it defines a strategic horizon circumscribed or not by the electoral dispute in the state.

A second difference concerns the party regime, democratic and diverse, focused on social intervention, or an electoral party strongly centralised in the figure of Boulos, who draws on the theorisations of Laclau and Mouffet. The issue is critical because, with the end of private campaign funding in 2016, parties with parliamentary representation now receive tens or hundreds of millions of dollars a year from state sources; each federal deputy can individually earmark ten million dollars for their initiatives!

A third divide is the centrality (or not) of ecosocialism in our programme and practice. Although self-evident in 20023 and now in 2024, the environmental theme is still poorly assimilated by the majority of the PSOL. And finally, there is the issue of democratic freedoms and socialist democracy. The left cannot fail to position itself as the champion of civil and political liberties, even though a large part of the PSOL's majority camp still claims to defend Ortega and Maduro as «anti-imperialists».

On these four issues and their derivatives, both the current around Boulos and the Resistance oppose the lines of force that the PSOL and the quartistas built up in the party's initial twelve years. Lines of force that have now accumulated in the Bloc of Opposition to the majority leadership, in which the MES is by far the largest current.

Faced with these rifts, which produce friction between certain quartist groups, we have to separate the formal organisational procedures from the political reality in order to position the Fourth Interna-

tional strategically.

A Brazilian section was reconstituted with the 2013 unification, taking the name *Insurgencia*, but it quickly failed. It fragmented into what are now six groups: *Insurgencia* (the majority), *Insurgencia RD*, *Subverta*, *Rebelião Ecosocialista*, *Centelhas* and the nucleus of militants from São Paulo (a group of which I am a member, partly made up of militants from the former DS who continue to organise and intervene politically and party-wide). These groups each organise from a few dozen to a maximum of three hundred militants. On the other hand, we have the MES, which is not part of the section but is more than a sympathetic organisation, integrated into the leadership structures of the IV. We have the APS, with an established relationship with the IV, participating as an observer. And we have Resistance's recent decision to be an observer at the International.

The fragmentation of the section is an expression of the PSOL's polarisation between the two different strategic directions we presented above. The two opposing orientations that exist in the PSOL today find their most finished expressions in Resistance (in Boulos' bloc) on the one hand and in the MES on the other. Some of the Insurgency and its derivatives have tried to escape this reality by attempting a party «centre» path, but they are unable to escape the objective polarisation between the «majority camp» and the «Left Bloc» (led by the MES). Each fragment of the former IV session formulates arguments to justify its independent existence, but the MES organises far more militants than all the fragments of the section put together, and even the smaller Resistance is still larger than all the militancy of the former Insurgency put together.

The 2025 World Congress will have to take a position on the MES's application for full membership of the IV. The approach of the Congress is the moment when all questions of political identity come to the fore. We need to adopt parameters that are coherent with the complex but consistent history of the IV in Brazil, which is why I have recalled our debate on party or sect-fraction, which was at the origin of the DS and its role in the PT, but also twenty years of the PSOL.

We are fighting in Brazil to build a mass party, the fruit of the cumulative work of the quartistas and other sectors

of the left who know the IV and respect its development and role. This intervention left broader roots than those of the current «IV» groups. Figures like Mandel, Bensaïd, Louçã, Löwy and Tanuro are references for militant Marxism and ecosocialists, including in the PT and Rede. The Fourth International is respected on the Brazilian left. It won't solve our problems, but it must relate positively to the processes underway in Brazil, understanding their complexity and diversity. It must reject all sectarian politics, all the caricatured legacy of sectarian Trotskyism and its endless bickering.

Let's take a closer look at the situation. In the 1990s, the militancy of the MES continued to dispute the direction of PTism in the same way as the DS. It was involved from the start with the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre. The MES founded and co-directed PSOL in its initial period. Its privileged relationship with Heloisa Helena helped them project a broader political intervention. The MES continued to build the party even when it became a minority in its leadership. Despite this, Luciana Genro, from the MES, was a successful presidential candidate representing the party as a whole in 2014. Since then, the MES has nationalised (with strong regional chapters in São Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul and Pará) and transmuted itself into an organisation of a different quality, black, feminist and ecosocialist, reinforcing its internationalism in its relationship with the IV, with a marked parliamentary intervention with Sâmia and Fernanda. This is the organisation with which IV interacts today.

A personal testimony: when the Insurgency was still unified, we formally defined that we would contest several regional groups for a process of merging with us: TLS, Barulho, Anticapitalistas and Primeiro de Maio; ALL of them ended up joining the MES and not the Insurgency. Even the former Espírito Santo regional of the Insurgency (and its state deputy) ended up joining the MES. This is due to the merits of the MES and its ability to build a pluralist political culture, anchored in open Marxism and the more internationalist practical intervention of the Brazilian left. Beyond any political bias, we have to be objective enough to recognise that the balance of Insurgency within the PSOL is that of a major defeat in its construction process; that of the MES is that of an important victory in the construction of its

organisation.

So it's understandable that, beyond the differences in orientation and strategy, there is a visceral reaction to the full integration of the MES into the IR on the part of cadres from the former Insurgency. This is particularly the case in the current Insurgency (majority), whose decision to administratively exclude what is now the Insurgency RD has essentially transformed it into a current of young people who woke up to politics in 2013; a militancy that has not been able to realise other experiences and that protects itself with a strong culture of self-proclamation. But in the PSOL, we all know perfectly well the trajectory, weight and positions of each political current. Objectivity and reasonableness, not passion and gossip, should guide our judgement.

Resistance is the fruit of a split from the PSTU in 2016. Its entry into the PSOL was positive, a move to oxygenate itself. They reconstituted a disciplined and flexible organisation within the PSOL, gaining ground by sticking to Boulos' leadership. They polarised parts of the old section of IV, *Insurgência* (the majority), towards a fusion, a rapprochement mediated by Boulos' leadership and what he promises in terms of insertion into Brazilian institutional politics. Despite our political differences, it is positive that the Resistance is trying to get closer to the IV.

The profusion of groups that are or want to be part of the IV is positive. There are relationships mediated by the image of the IV with more currents of the PSOL, Rede and PT, re-qualified by ecosocialism. The desire to get to know and participate in the IV expresses a political reality on the Brazilian left that could intensify in the coming period. There are real political differences, but they always exist and, in the final sum, the International can be a healthy forum to help with convergences and global elaboration. This is perfectly manageable by the test of practice, as we did with the old DS in the PT, which also remained a section until it simply abandoned the IV when it distanced itself from Marxism.

The MES must be admitted as part of the «section» (which must not have an administrative outline, but must be maintained as a space for dialogue and will see new developments) and those who want to claim a place in the IV, accepting its premises, must have the possibility of

Brazil

joining it without vetoes. The political processes in the PSOL will be resolved by the dynamics of the class struggle in Brazil.

The centrifugal tendencies resulting from the decline of neoliberal globalisation and its morbid symptoms are expressed in the Fourth International. We know that the European left and the IV in the region are facing a difficult scenario, with the relative European retreat, the War in Ukraine and the questions about regional security and NATO that it raises, and the rise of neo-fascism. New cleavages emerge and tension our global debates. At the same time, IV is following an encouraging path of construction in Asia.

Brazil has had an important place in global and Latin American progressive politics over the last half-century and is likely to continue to do so. All this makes the MES, due to its weight, insertion and internationalist practice, a decisive organisation for the construction of the IV and for its recomposition in a continent of strong social conflict. This means a leap in quality for the International and a bet like the one we made in the 1980s with the DS.

This clashes with established routines and pushes European groups that aspire to play a role in the Americas out of their comfort zone. There is even talk of a veto on the entry of the MES. But if this is real, it would be an anachronism, a return to the sect-fraction dynamics of the 1970s. How can a European section veto the entry of an organisation from another continent that is in complete political harmony with the International, the entry of a group that is larger than any other organisation that currently makes up the IV? It seems that the integration of the SSM into the IV is the issue that will define what kind of international organisation we will be in the years to come, which will be decisive for humanity.


São Paulo, 17th September 2024

José Correa and Ana
Cristina Carvalhaes*


* José Correa was a leader of DS and Insurgencia, and an animator of the World Social Forum. Today he is leading the World Assembly for the Amazon. Ana Cristina Carvalhaes is a member of the FI International Committee.




fourth.international



inprecor.fr



internationalviewpoint.org



puntodevistainternacional.org

Motion on the preparation of the 18th World Congress in 2025

Date and place

1. The World Congress will take place from 22nd February to 28th February 2025 in the same place as the preceding World Congress.

Agenda

2. The agenda for the congress will be
- report discussion and vote on the Manifesto for the Fourth International
 - report discussion and vote on the resolution on orientation and tasks in the social movements
 - report discussion and vote on a resolution on the role and party-building tasks of the Fourth International;
 - report discussion and vote on the report on the international situation;
 - report and discussion in regional meetings on Europe, Latin America, Asia, Africa, Middle East;
 - report from the Mandates Commission and other organizational commissions;
 - report on finances;
 - election of the leadership (IC, Appeals Commission).

Texts

3. The resolutions for voting must not exceed 40,000 characters. All counts are made for the English editions.

4. The draft Manifesto will not exceed 80000 characters. Any specific modalities for the discussion and publication will be decided by the Bureau on the proposal of the working group.

5. The discussion will be opened by the publication of the documents adopted at the 24-28 February 2024 IC meeting which will be sent to the national organizations by 30 March.

Discussion Bulletin

6. A discussion bulletin will then be opened and continue for the period leading up to the world congress. Resolutions for voting must be submitted at the latest by 15 November 2024. Discussion contributions must be submitted by 31 December 2024.

7. Contributions must not exceed 15000 characters. The total of the articles for the discussion bulletin will not exceed 600,000 characters.

8. Submissions can be made from the sections and national organizations, sympathizing groups, permanent observers and nuclei linked to the Fourth International, on the basis of the list established by the Mandates Commission at the 2018 Congress or recognized by the IC since then. Contributions must be submitted by the organization's leadership or by individual members of the IC.

9. The Discussion Bulletin will be produced in 3 languages English, Castilian/Spanish, French. The Bureau is charged with producing the bulletin on condition that the national organizations contribute to the translation.

10. The Bureau will send the discussion bulletin contents by e-mail to the national organizations, which are responsible for publishing and circulating them. National organizations should inform the secretariat if they are publishing the bulletin in

languages that are used by other organizations.

11. It is the obligation of all FI organizations to make all contributions available to the membership in appropriate internal bulletins and to provide democratic internal mechanisms for the rank and file to participate in the WC discussion.

12. National organizations and the Bureau can use the draft documents adopted to initiate discussions with political forces with which they have political relations.

Delegation

13. For the delegates votes to be validated at the World Congress the national organizations must have paid dues for 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024.

14. The delegates to the conference will be elected, in the modalities that each organization considers appropriate, on the following ratio:

- each organization of members of the Fourth International has of right 1 full delegate;
- one additional delegate is accorded for each hundred comrades or remainder of 50+ starting from the first hundred (e.g 1-50 members 1 delegate, 51-150 members 1+1 delegate, 151-250 members 1+2 delegates, and so on).

The Congress

15. Members of the outgoing IC and Appeals Commission will be seated at the Congress with voice and consultative vote.

16. Representatives of recognized sympathizing organizations and Permanent Observers will be seated at the Congress with voice and indicative vote.

17. The IC mandates the Bureau to decide on invitations to the Congress in collaboration with the section leaderships. The Bureau will ensure that the overall number of participants is adapted to the size of the Congress venue.

Finances

18. The IC mandates the Bureau to find the means to finance the World Congress through:

- ensuring that all organizations are up to date with their dues payments;
- organising a suitable World Congress levy for each organization in collaboration with the organization leaderships including sympathizing organizations and Permanent Observers on the basis of 1€/1US\$ per member for organizations in the Global South, 10€/10US\$ per member for organizations in the Global North;
- organising a special fund drive of 30 000 euros, focusing on the travel costs for delegates from the Global South.
- if necessary use of the financial reserves, not to exceed one-third of the sum available.

19. The sum available for travel aid will be 50 000 euros.

20. The IC mandates the Bureau to find administrative technical resources for the preparation of the World Congress, the costs to be borne by the general budget.